Le 13-avr.-06, à 15:37, 1Z a écrit :

> Your version of comp seems to be that an abstract algorithm In Plato's
> heaven can implement a mind, even though it isn't a process occurring
> over a span of time. Admitedly you seem to get there via the idea
> that minds can be transferred into processes running on material
> computers  (which is what I regard as the standard version of
> computationalism),
> but you then decide that the matter and the process is redundant --
> becaus
> the pereceived world of a computational mind would appear to be
> physical
> and temporal. But an computational mind can only have those -- or any
> --
> perceptions if it can have consciousness in the first place. If matter
> and process are needed to make an algorithm conscious, as the standard
> version of computationalims tacitly assumes, they are NOT redundant !



Yes but I have shown that, once the comp hyp is taken seriously enough, 
then matter and process are not needed for consciousness; indeed 
everything communicable (quanta) and uncommunicable (qualia) about 
"matter and process" emerges from the relations between numbers.
 From a strict logical point of view you can still believe in comp and 
in (primitive, stuffy) matter and processes, but then you can prove 
that, if ever you are lucky enough to get there, the probability you 
stay there is null. You just cannot attach your consciousness or even 
just the results of your experiments, to any material world, so why 
introduce one?

Of course you can decide that this is a so startling result that you 
don't need to read the proof, but then, what could I add?

Are you willing to doubt the existence of stuffy stuff, or are you 
*sure* about it?  Could you conceive you being wrong about that 
question? I know people believe in "what they see" since about 1500 
years (since the end of (neo) platonism).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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