Le 10-mai-06, à 04:19, Russell Standish a écrit :
James Higgo published a web page describing the history of quantum
suicide aka comp suicide. The notion obvious predates both Tegmark and
Marchal - and there is some anecdotal evidence that Edward Teller knew
about the argument in the early eighties. It appears to have been a
"dirty little secret", which has only really been considered
acceptable talk in polite scientific circles in the last 10 years or so.
I explain quantum suicide, and I use it to explain the "comp immortality" in:
Marchal B., Informatique théorique et philosophie de l’esprit. Actes du 3ème colloque international de l’ARC, Toulouse 1988.
I have presented orally the paper at Toulouse in 1987. The paper contains the movie graph argument, and a much earlier version of that paper contains the RE paradox, one of many version of the UDA. That earlier paper has been published in two parts later under the forms:
Marchal B., Mechanism and Personal Identity, proceedings of WOCFAI 91, M. De Glas & D. Gabbay (Eds), Angkor, Paris, 1991.
Marchal B., 1992, Amoeba, Planaria, and Dreaming Machines, in Bourgine & Varela (Eds), Artificial Life, towards a practice of autonomous systems, ECAL 91, MIT press.
Look, you can see my work as the given of a purely arithmetical (more generally lobian) "reconstruction" of Lucas-Penrose type of argument against mechanism. Only, such argument does not show that we are not machine but only that *in case* we are machine *then* we cannot know which machine we are, nor can we know which computational paths support us, and there is already an indeterminacy there. Then I illustrate that we (I mean the (hopefully) lobian machines) can reflect that indeterminacy. You can see it as a generalization of Everett's embedding of the physicists in the physical world; where instead I embed the mathematician (actually some arithmetican) in the mathematical (arithmetical) world. In both case this makes sense only when we distinguished first person and third person discourse.
But now, my preceding point was just that the existence of the discourse about "quantum suicide" or "quantum immortality", which appears from empirical reasons, confirms the general statement that comp implies that any machine looking at herself below its substitution level should discover empirically the indetermination about which computations which support her, from which the comp immortality follows.
Obviously (?) I am suspecting a big part of the physical emerges "already" from the impossible statistics on number relations once you mix addition and multiplication. The advantage of the "self-referential" approach (just made easier by comp, but it works on many type of non-machine or generalized infinite machines) is that it provides at its roots a difference between the truth and the true discourses on those questions (got through G* \ G and its intensional variants), the arithmetical "Hypostases" as I am tempted to call them since I read Plotinus.
You can see what I am mainly trying to say as: "oh look we can *already* interview a universal machine about fundamental questions". I illustrate this by interviewing a lobian machine on the logics of the communicable, knowable and "bettable" (by Universal Machines) pertaining on verifiable propositions (here verifiable = accessible by the Universal Dovetailer.
The goal: extract the whole measure on the relative continuations. Not just the logic of certainty.
The problem at this stage is mathematical and concerns the existence of not of some Hopf algebra of trees capable of explaining how to renormalize in front of the "arithmetical" white rabbits.
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