Le 15-mai-06, à 13:59, Russell Standish a écrit :

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>> OK, why not taking that difference [description/computation] into >> account. I think it is a >> crucial point. > > I do :). However, its makes no difference as far as I can tell to the > Occam's razor issue. You do? See below. > >> >> >> >>> given a reference Turing machine U. This appears >>> to be a 3rd person description, but it need not be so. >> >> >> I am not sure I understand. >> > > Do you mean you don't think it is a 3rd person description, or do you > mean you don't think it can be anything else? I think it is a third person description. <snip> >> I really don't understand. >> >> Bruno >> > > The details, of course are in my paper "Why Occams Razor". To > summarise, an observer induces a map O(x) from the space of > descriptions, which is equivalent AFAIK to the output of your UD, ? The UD has neither inputs nor outputs. (like any "universe" or "everything", note) > to > the space of meanings. Which space is it? What do you mean (here) by "meanings"? If it is a mathematical semantics then which one, if not, I don't understand. I already ask you similar question after my first reading of your Occam). > For any given meaning y, let omega(y,l) be the > number of equivalent descriptions of length l mapping to y (for > infinite length description we need the length l prefixes). So > > omega(y,l) = |{x: O(x)=y & len(x)=l}| > > Now P(y) = lim_{l->\infty} omega(y,l)/2^l is a probability > distribution, related to the Solomonoff-Levin universal > distribution. > > C(y)=-log_2 P(y) > > is a complexity measure related to Kolmogorov Complexity. Note that this approach is non constructive (and thus cannot be first person, at least as I use it and modelize it). I have already argued that it can be refined through the notion of depth (a la Bennett), which takes a notion of "long" computation into account; but it is still incomplete relatively to the first person indeterminacy problem (pertaining on the set of *all* (relative) computations, and not at all on the set of descriptions). The non-constructibility is a problem here, given the goal of deducing physical laws or principles "without physics". > > Basically this is an Occams Razor theorem - the probability of > observing something decreases dramatically with its observed > complexity. And this is a pure 1st person result. ? > It doesn't get rid > of all white rabbits, but the remaining ones are dealt with the > Malcolm-Standish argument. If you have succeed in eliminating all the "many person pov" - white rabbits, then publish! Frankly it seems to me you don't really address the first person issue (and thus the mind/body issue). For example, what is your theory of mind? In particular, do you say yes to the comp doctor? I think that eventually, we have to limit ourself to the discourses that a self-referentially correct machine (or entity, or growing entities of such lobian kind) can have about herself and her possibilities. I am not saying your argument is wrong, just that is incomplete (and unclear, but this could be my incompetence). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---