Le 19-juin-06, à 15:31, Russell Standish a écrit :

> I'm not so sure. At heart, I suspect he is a computationalist, however
> what he assumes in his papers is that the universe (that we see) is a 
> single
> specific computation selected from the dovetailer algorithm. With COMP 
> (and
> with functionalism too) we assume that consciousness supervenes on all
> consistent computations, which leads to your famous first person
> indeterminism result. Schmidhuber's assumption directly implies
> determinism (we are living inside one particular computation only).
>
> I do not see Schmidhuber's argument as inconsistent, but it does seem
> to contradict COMP, so Schmidhuber may have inconsistent faiths if he
> insists both on this argument and COMP.


I agree here. I still don't understand why you call "description" what 
is really just a real number (or a real number from the unit interval). 
I will try to read my Levin Solomonov literature, if only to see if we 
are just quibbling on terminology or on something more fundamental. To 
see program as prefix of infinite string is interesting if you are 
interested in Kolmogorov-Chaitin-Solovay-Martin-Löf sort of (quasi 
absolute) probability measure, like in the search of a Bayesian sort of 
ASSA Udist (which, I have often argue miss the relative self-sampling 
assumption forced by the 1-3 distinction).

I disagree (but this I already told you) with your mention of universal 
dovetailing in Schmidhuber, given that if you select a specific 
computation there is no more need to dovetail. This is, at the least, 
pedagogically confusing. Sure, Church Thesis and Universal Machine 
should play an important role in Schmidhuber, but there is no reason to 
dovetail universally. This appears when you realize comp makes it 
impossible to attach consciousness to any specific computation 
(material or not) that is when you get the comp first person 
indeterminacy.

A last note: speed prior, like in Schmidhuber second paper, seems to 
contradict the basic idea of its first paper. With notion of prior we 
can just go back to (theoretical) physics. QM is easily derivable from 
few assumptions on probability and symmetry and math, but this I take 
as cheating when asking fundamental questions. More technically the 
speed prior seems to be in contradiction with the fact that "universal 
machine" can be sped up infinitely (Blum speed up theorem). Speed prior 
would favorize *big* programs. We can come back later on this more 
technical issue.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to