Le 19-juin-06, à 15:31, Russell Standish a écrit :

> I'm not so sure. At heart, I suspect he is a computationalist, however > what he assumes in his papers is that the universe (that we see) is a > single > specific computation selected from the dovetailer algorithm. With COMP > (and > with functionalism too) we assume that consciousness supervenes on all > consistent computations, which leads to your famous first person > indeterminism result. Schmidhuber's assumption directly implies > determinism (we are living inside one particular computation only). > > I do not see Schmidhuber's argument as inconsistent, but it does seem > to contradict COMP, so Schmidhuber may have inconsistent faiths if he > insists both on this argument and COMP. I agree here. I still don't understand why you call "description" what is really just a real number (or a real number from the unit interval). I will try to read my Levin Solomonov literature, if only to see if we are just quibbling on terminology or on something more fundamental. To see program as prefix of infinite string is interesting if you are interested in Kolmogorov-Chaitin-Solovay-Martin-Löf sort of (quasi absolute) probability measure, like in the search of a Bayesian sort of ASSA Udist (which, I have often argue miss the relative self-sampling assumption forced by the 1-3 distinction). I disagree (but this I already told you) with your mention of universal dovetailing in Schmidhuber, given that if you select a specific computation there is no more need to dovetail. This is, at the least, pedagogically confusing. Sure, Church Thesis and Universal Machine should play an important role in Schmidhuber, but there is no reason to dovetail universally. This appears when you realize comp makes it impossible to attach consciousness to any specific computation (material or not) that is when you get the comp first person indeterminacy. A last note: speed prior, like in Schmidhuber second paper, seems to contradict the basic idea of its first paper. With notion of prior we can just go back to (theoretical) physics. QM is easily derivable from few assumptions on probability and symmetry and math, but this I take as cheating when asking fundamental questions. More technically the speed prior seems to be in contradiction with the fact that "universal machine" can be sped up infinitely (Blum speed up theorem). Speed prior would favorize *big* programs. We can come back later on this more technical issue. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---