Stephen writes (BTW, thanks for using plain text :-) > I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm > itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for > mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation > in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can > be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. > > AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any > property, including properties that involve some notion of chance.
What properties do you have in mind that pure platonic algorithms seem to lack? Anything, that is, besides *time* itself? Thanks, Lee P.S. I am not up to speed on this thread at all. > That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that > physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, > there is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be > instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary. > > Quentin --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---