Le 30-juin-06, à 21:06, John M a écrit :
> "I agree. Other people are part of the model of the
> world we form. And in the same way the existence of
> myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that
> Brent Meeker"
> Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close
> on solipsism?
I agree, and, with all my respect to Brent, I would say it is an
illustration of a typical "error" of the *first* person. Because she is
unable to convince herself (neither in some personal third person way,
nor in any first person ways) of the existence of another, she forgets
she can correctly bet on that "others". And this even if with comp we
can prove (communicate to oneself in a third person way) that the
*correctness* of that bet is necessarily of the type of serendipitous
> An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing
> the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?).
> I would not say "dead", rather 'changed' as into some
> different one. (It is a gradual change, death is being
> thought of as something more abrupt and
> In spite of that, knowing that when as a 5-yo I had
> different person-ality and ideas, brainfunction and
> emotions, I still feel NOW identity with THAT PERSON.
I understand you. In particular, if some bad even happens, or not, to a
child at his third birthday event, whatever computational influence
this can have for the personality of that person, its future 1-present
will reflect that 1-past event in a probable "1-continuous" way to its
1-present. Somehow, we are, at each instant, partially defined by a
"product" of our (possible) 1-past(s), as we are dually partially
defined by a "sum" of our 1-futures.
(A product like a big "and", a sum like a big "or").
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