Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :
> > It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
> > a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
> > to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.
> How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
> First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without
> infinite regress.
"No one" ? But there are far more materialist
philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays.
> Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance
> such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the
> property of its subparts (Aristotle the first).
Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day.
> But then, the
> ontological existence of such "substance" does not fit neither the
> experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those
> facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL).
The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which
can be measured and does feature in theories.
> If you want use the ontological existence of "matter" to solve the
> Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only
> way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable
> infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on
> the list or in my url.
if you are going to assume that
a) all computations already exist immaterially
b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational
or mathematical property
you might be lead to that conculusion. But I don't assume
> And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to
> explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the
> mind/body problem).
The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience
to mathematical descriptions. Adding matter to Platonia certainly
doesn't make things worse.
> > The question is not whether there is a world beyond even
> > logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much
> > smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily.
> That the "observed world" is smaller than platonia is trivial: our
> observation are finite, and platonia is infinite.
> Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an
> ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer
> it is smaller than platonia.
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
> Actually many infinities appears at the
> bottom, and it is hard how to interpret them.
> > The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the
> > difference between ontology and epistemology, between
> > "to be" and "to know". Then they would not slide
> > from "X cannot be known without an observer" to "X cannot exist without
> > an observer".
> You make a good point, but I am not sure it is a genuine answer for
> John or me.
> I will not insist because it is an easy consequence of the UDA (and I
> recall you saying you don't want to study it because, if I remember
> well, you are so sure the result is false that you don't need to read
> it, but then you miss the opportunity to either find a real error of
> reasoning in my deduction or to discover that the greek theologian were
> right, and naturalism (nature deification) is wrong).
You are not going to get anywhere with the
UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
argument for that -- AR as you call it --
just repeats the same error: the epistemological
claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
from us in Plato's heaven".
> 1Z to Lennart Nilsson
> > I am trying to get away from the idea that logic needs to
> > be propped up by some external authority. The validity
> > of logic comes about from the lack of any basis
> > to criticise it that doesn't presuppose it. That's
> > epistemology, not metaphysics.
> I agree for the part of logic use in elementary mathematical theories.
> Still there has been (and still exist) some critics on some formula.
> The most known case is the case of the third excluded principle (A v
> ~A). In my context such a critics is a confusion between first person
> and third person. Could say more when I get to the Arithmetical
> Hypostases ...
The criticism uses logic.
> 1Z to Brent
> > The claim I made was "Whatever else you
> > do, you'll be using logic. There is no
> > standpoint outside of logic. No, not
> > even evolutionary theory".
> I agree with you, as an arithmetical platonist.
My point was purely epistemological.
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