Jesse Mazer wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > >The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, > >as predicted by Platonic theories. > > > >It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, > >it is falsified. > > But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to > the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the > idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for) > would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would > assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry > Potter universes.

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They *need* that idea, certainly. The success of mathematical MW theories depends very much on being able to find a natural, intrinsic justification for measure. Physical MW theories are very much on the same side of the fence as classical single-universe theories. In both cases, "measure" is extraneous to what is being measure. In physical MWI, measure is given by Schrodinger's equation, which is not justified platonically; it is justified empirically. In single-world theories , measure is 1 or 0 -- the Law of the Excluded Middle holds. > Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry > Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape > of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events > in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts > they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such > events on human timescales. And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. > >You are not going to get anywhere with the > >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your > >argument for that -- AR as you call it -- > >just repeats the same error: the epistemological > >claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent" > >is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists > >separately > >from us in Plato's heaven". > But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, > that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. "Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS " (emphasis added) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1 > this is itself > an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ? > Few would literally > imagine some alternate dimension called "Plato's heaven" where platonic > forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our > brains to produce our ideas about math. Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world, as Bruno requires. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---