Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >>
> >> How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
> >
> > By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
>
>
> I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
> explains nothing, like when "God" is used as an (empty) explanation.

It "explains nothing" in the sense that it buys out of the
rationalist dream of explaining the universe on purely logical
principles. OTOH, it buys into the other style of explanation,
positing the existence of contingent entitites on the basis
of empirical evidence. Of course that style of evidence
fits the evidence much better, in that we don't experience every
logically possible universe simultaneously.

> Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E =
> mc^2),

But only *certain* numbers. If we are in Platonia,
we should be seeing F=m^a , F=ma^3 and all the
other infinite possibilites.

>  but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if
> they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc.

So ? Those question are all posed within the
framework that empricism-substance-contingency.

Being unable to answer those questions doesn't
enttile us to say that nothing exists or
everything exists.

> (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual
> difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there
> is still many remaining questions OK?

Physical MWI are still on the empiricism-substance-contingency.
side of the fence, not the raitonalism-idealism-ncessity side.


> >> First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without
> >> infinite regress.
> >
> > "No one" ? But there are far more materialist
> > philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays.
>
>
> For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
> none of your materialist even try to define matter.

"Materiality is the pre-condition fo anything being
able to interact with me casually"

There.

> They take it for
> granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
> knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.

Why not ? It's *a* table not all possible tables.

> (btw, invoking the number of people believing something is not an
> argument).

I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since
you idn't state them, only alluding to them.

> All what I say, is that the notion of "primitive matter" is unclear.
> The only definition which we can find in Aristotle is contradict by QM
> and comp, independently.

I've just given you a definitiion.


> >> Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance
> >> such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the
> >> property of its subparts (Aristotle the first).
> >
> > Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day.
>
>
> Not about matter.


Of course, about matter. Matter is now "mostly empty space",
it is now "interchangeable with energy".

>  Except recently through the slow admittance of
> quantum (computation) which makes even engineers accepting (like
> Mellac) that the quantum formalism forces us to choose between:
> 1) a NON observed reality does not exist (like Bohr often said)
> 2) Parallel realities exist

there are many othe options, inlcuding

3) a non-observed reality exists, and prallel realities are curtailed
by
an objective, observer-independent  process of reduction (Penrose)


> >> But then, the
> >> ontological existence of such "substance" does not fit neither the
> >> experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those
> >> facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL).
> >
> > The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which
> > can be measured and does feature in theories.
>
>
> But the measurment gives numbers. *You* posit some (which btw?)
> interpretation.

Certain numbers, not every possible number.


> > if you are going to assume that
> > a) all computations already exist immaterially
>
> OK, but in the same sense that PI or sqrt(2) exists.

Which as far as I am concerned, is not at all.

> > b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational
> > or mathematical property
>
>
> Where do I make that assumption.

I don't know. You didn't actually give an argument. so I am
just guessing.

> You forget the main assumption I do: my (generlaized) brain is turing
> emulable. (or more simply: "yes doctor").

As a material systesm, it can be emulated by antoher, suitable ,
material system...


> Church thesis and AR are assumed explicitly for making things clearer,
> and avoiding spurious debate in the course of the proof.

Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your only
assumption, CT and AR are *not* assumed explicitly.


> Now if you assume "primary matter", no doubt you need to reject comp,
> giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.

Brains are material. Computers are material.

> > The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience
> > to mathematical descriptions.  Adding matter to Platonia certainly
> > doesn't make things worse.
>
>
> It does (with comp).

Comp is about the behaviour of the brain as a material system.

> cf UDA. (or just the movie graph, or Maudlin's
> Olympia).




> > You are not going to get anywhere with the
> > UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism,
>
> Why should I prove my assumptions?

You could at least state them.


> > and your
> > argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> > just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> > claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
>
> That is my only claim.

How does truth-values do anything ?


> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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