The fact that comp => no material world is this:
1- If comp is true, then you (the 1st person) is defined by all computations (an infinity) that pass through your state, hence the "you" does not belong to one and only one computation.
2- Then as you cannot associate you with a computation you won't be able to do it in a so called material world if any, because the material world is perceive through you and you by the preceeding point is generated by all computation going through this point, hence material world is useless.
The demonstration of Bruno is based on physical supervenience (whether or not a change in the physical level implies a change in the computation level). I think the olympia machine of lee maudlin and the movie graph argument of Bruno show that a computation does not supervene on the material level.
Another thing is, if you are part of a computation, and somehow someone succeed to throw you out of it and tells you that now you are in the real world... How could you know this one is real (despite the fact that you know the preceeding wasn't in front of evidence showed to you) ? If the first wasn't real, then why this would be ? why a primary real would exists in this system ?
On 7/14/06, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
I think I can follow Bruno's UDA up to the point of the point where he shows that comp => no material world exists. You seem to understand it and you aren't Bruno (at least, I assume you're not Bruno: none of us on this list can really be sure of these things, can we? ;). Would you be kind enough to explain it to me?
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: email@example.com
> Subject: Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
> Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2006 21:40:20 +0000
> 1Z wrote:
> > I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
> > demostrated
> > otherwise.
> This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
> Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
> reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean anything in this
> So the point is not that you accept or not computationalism and
> stuffy/not stuffy stuff... It is just that if you accept
> computationalism you cannot accept a primary reality... If you do not
> (as it seems) then it's normal, but you cannot claim computationalism
> at the same time, Bruno proved that it is not compatible.
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