Bruno Marchal writes:

> Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing  
> emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an  
> explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working  
> hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non computationalist.
> I met David Chalmers in Brussels in 2000 (at the Brussels ASSC  
> meeting). He *is* indeed quite coherent, in the sense that he considers  
> that in the self-duplication Washington/Moscow experiment the first  
> person must feel to be at the two places simultaneously.

I'm surprised at this, and I don't see how it fits with the rest of his theory 
of consciousness. 

> This is coherent also with his dualist interpretation of Everett. Now,  
> I personally agree with Hans Primas, and David Deutsch, that Everett's  
> move is motivated by a search for a monistic view of (quantum) reality.
> [For the modalist: Note that the G-difference (but G*-equality)   
> between Bp and Bp & p makes it possible, *through* comp to justify  
> phenomenologically (i.e. in first person terms) the gap between the two  
> aspects of the mind defended by Chalmers.]
> About Chalmers's dualism: see:
> Chalmers.html

The cited article a rather emotional criticism of Chalmer's ideas. What it 
seems to amount to is this. Suppose someone figures out the Mystery of 
Consciousness, much simpler than we all suspected, as follows: whenever a 
switch goes through a particular sequence 101011010010011, then that is 
necessary and sufficient to produce a conscious experience. The 
anti-chalmerites will rejoice and say that's it, philosophers of mind can all 
pack up their bags and go home, we now know everything there is to know about 
consciousness. The chalmerites, on the other hand, will say, that's very 
interesting, but we still haven't the slightest idea what it is like to 
experience that switching sequence unless we, well, actually experience that 
switching sequence. Working out that the sequence creates a conscious 
experience is the "easy" problem, explaining why it creates a conscious 
experience at all, or why a particular conscious experience, is the "hard" 
problem. Both groups agree on the facts, but the chalmerites think it's pretty 
amazing that a conscious experience is produced, while the anti-chalmerites 
think it's no big deal, in fact not even worthy of the name "problem", let 
alone "hard problem". I don't see that there is a dispute here at all regarding 
empirical or logical facts. The dispute seems to be over an attitude to the 

Stathis Papaioannou
Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to