1Z wrote: > >Jesse Mazer wrote: > > > > >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing > > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an > > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working > > >hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non computationalist. > > > > Why would Chalmers' version of dualism be non-computationalist? > >That would depend on whether you are dealing with >consciousness-is-computation computationalism >or cognition-is-computation computationalism.
Even with the consciousness-is-computation computationalism, it depends on what your definition of "is" is...if you understand it to mean that a conscious experience is nothing more than an alternate way of describing a certain computation, I suppose Chalmers would not be a "computationalist" in this sense, but if you just understand it to mean that the experience and the computation are inextricably linked then he still could be called a computationalist. > > > As I > > understand him, he does argue that there is a one-to-one relationship > > between computations and conscious experiences, > >But not an identity relationship. But what if the one-to-one relationship is not understood to be contingent, i.e. the relationship between first-person qualia and third-person descriptions of computations is the same in all possible worlds? > > and he certainly believes > > that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would *behave* just >like > > the original. > >But that is underpinned by psychophysical laws, not identity. If the psychophysical laws are a matter of necessary truth, I'm not sure this is a meaningful distinction...as an analogy, "1+1" being equal to "2" could be said to be underpinned by the laws of arithmetic, but if these laws are necessary ones, then isn't "1+1" also identical with "2"? > > Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what >I > > meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for >deciding > > when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated >physically, > > with each instantiation contributing to the total measure of that > > computation. > >What Chalmers means is something much more metaphysical. I agree, but I wasn't saying this was *all* he meant by psychophysical laws, just that the "instantiation problem" is *one* of the questions that psychophysical laws are supposed to answer. Jesse --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---