1Z wrote:

>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
> > >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> > >hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non computationalist.
> >
> > Why would Chalmers' version of dualism be non-computationalist?
>
>That would depend on whether you are dealing with
>consciousness-is-computation computationalism
>or cognition-is-computation computationalism.

Even with the consciousness-is-computation computationalism, it depends on 
what your definition of "is" is...if you understand it to mean that a 
conscious experience is nothing more than an alternate way of describing a 
certain computation, I suppose Chalmers would not be a "computationalist" in 
this sense, but if you just understand it to mean that the experience and 
the computation are inextricably linked then he still could be called a 
computationalist.

>
> > As I
> > understand him, he does argue that there is a one-to-one relationship
> > between computations and conscious experiences,
>
>But not an identity relationship.

But what if the one-to-one relationship is not understood to be contingent, 
i.e. the relationship between first-person qualia and third-person 
descriptions of computations is the same in all possible worlds?

> >  and he certainly believes
> > that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would *behave* just 
>like
> > the original.
>
>But that is underpinned by psychophysical laws, not identity.

If the psychophysical laws are a matter of necessary truth, I'm not sure 
this is a meaningful distinction...as an analogy, "1+1" being equal to "2" 
could be said to be underpinned by the laws of arithmetic, but if these laws 
are necessary ones, then isn't "1+1" also identical with "2"?

> > Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what 
>I
> > meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for 
>deciding
> > when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated 
>physically,
> > with each instantiation contributing to the total measure of that
> > computation.
>
>What Chalmers means is something much more metaphysical.

I agree, but I wasn't saying this was *all* he meant by psychophysical laws, 
just that the "instantiation problem" is *one* of the questions that 
psychophysical laws are supposed to answer.

Jesse



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