>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> > >hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non computationalist.
> > Why would Chalmers' version of dualism be non-computationalist?
>That would depend on whether you are dealing with
>or cognition-is-computation computationalism.
Even with the consciousness-is-computation computationalism, it depends on
what your definition of "is" is...if you understand it to mean that a
conscious experience is nothing more than an alternate way of describing a
certain computation, I suppose Chalmers would not be a "computationalist" in
this sense, but if you just understand it to mean that the experience and
the computation are inextricably linked then he still could be called a
> > As I
> > understand him, he does argue that there is a one-to-one relationship
> > between computations and conscious experiences,
>But not an identity relationship.
But what if the one-to-one relationship is not understood to be contingent,
i.e. the relationship between first-person qualia and third-person
descriptions of computations is the same in all possible worlds?
> > and he certainly believes
> > that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would *behave* just
> > the original.
>But that is underpinned by psychophysical laws, not identity.
If the psychophysical laws are a matter of necessary truth, I'm not sure
this is a meaningful distinction...as an analogy, "1+1" being equal to "2"
could be said to be underpinned by the laws of arithmetic, but if these laws
are necessary ones, then isn't "1+1" also identical with "2"?
> > Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what
> > meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for
> > when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated
> > with each instantiation contributing to the total measure of that
> > computation.
>What Chalmers means is something much more metaphysical.
I agree, but I wasn't saying this was *all* he meant by psychophysical laws,
just that the "instantiation problem" is *one* of the questions that
psychophysical laws are supposed to answer.
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