Jesse Mazer writes:
> Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what I
> meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for deciding
> when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated physically,
> with each instantiation contributing to the total measure of that
> computation. You don't even have to postulate a special "physical universe",
> you could just ask how frequently copies of a smaller computation are being
> instantiated in a larger computation (like a computation representing the
> evolution of the universal wavefunction, or a computation representing the
> universal uovetailer). For example, let's say I identify a given
> observer-moment with a particular computation O which represents all the
> computations going on in the observer's brain during that moment (with a
> 'moment' of subjective experience presumably corresponding to computations
> spread out over tens or hundreds of milliseconds in the physical brain)
> which are relevant to what the observer subjectively experiences in that
> moment (and there might be plenty of things going on in the physical brain
> that *aren't* relevant, like random thermal vibrations of atoms in neurons).
> Suppose I also have a larger computation E which is a detailed simulation of
> a physical environment that happens to include a brain that seems to be
> doing what appears to be a similar set of computations; in this case the
> "psychophysical laws" would be some rules that would tell us whether the
> larger computation E does in fact contain an "instantiation" of O within it.
> And if we postulate some ultimate base-level computation representing
> "objective physical reality", like the simulation of the universal
> wavefunction or the universal dovetailer, this might contain instantiations
> of every possible program, but it might instantiate some more frequently
> than others, thus giving some observer-moments higher measure than others.
> Finally, even if we reject the idea of a single base-level computation, the
> idea of larger computations containing instantiations of smaller ones within
> them might still be relevant, since if you identify observer-moments with
> particular computations, some observer-moments might contain copies of
> smaller ones within them, and this would have to be taken into account in
> the sort of "measure battle" that you talk about in other posts.
> So, do you think that the idea of "psychophysical laws" whose sole purpose
> is to decide if larger computations contain instantiations of smaller ones,
> and therefore contribute to their overall measure, violates
> "computationalism" as you understand it? If so, why?
What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent: some give rise to mind, while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a computer could never be conscious because even if it exactly emulated a human brain, it is a law of nature that only brains can be conscious?
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- RE: Re: Bruno's argument Stathis Papaioannou
- RE: Re: Bruno's argument Jesse Mazer
- Re: Bruno's argument Brent Meeker