Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent: 
>some give rise to mind, >while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't 
>this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a >computer could 
>never be conscious because even if it exactly emulated a human brain, it is 
>a law of >nature that only brains can be conscious?

No, not at all--where did you get the idea I was saying "apparently similar" 
computations would not give rise to minds? The psychophysical laws are 
supposed to insure that a computations which appears completely *dissimilar* 
to a human mind, like a simulation of the movement of atoms in a rock, does 
not in fact qualify as an implementation of (or contribute to the measure 
of) my mind and every other possible mind, as would be concluded by 
Maudlin's argument or Bruno's movie-graph argument, as I understand them. 
See Chalmers' paper "Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?" at for more on this "implementation problem".


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