1Z wrote: > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option. > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity. > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness. > > The objection that being arrayed along the 4th dimension would split > consciousness up is week; we don't have a micro-conscousness associated > with each neuron, despite their spatial separation. Why should temporal > separation have ant atomising, fragmenting effect --wehn B-series time > is so similar to space anyway ?
I had an interesting exchange with Julian Barbour about this a while back. Originally I was convinced he was wrong that a time capsule was sufficient to produce the subjective experience of the passage of time. I called it a 'sleight of intuition' because all the time-related words we use simply *assume* such a passage and hence slip this sense in by the back door. He said a lot of people agreed with me, but his static concept of Platonia meant he was committed to his view actually being the case, without further arguments. However, I've changed my original view. I think the fact we don't experience consciousness 'smeared' or 'overlaid' over the 4th dimension is a function of memory, which delimits what information is available to be made conscious at any given point. This source of information is different in each (conscious) time capsule, and determines the boundaries of the view from that capsule. This is analogous to why we don't experience multiple versions in MWI, or in teleportation. The relevant question is always 'what information is available to me here?', where 'me' and 'here' are correlated within a discrete structure (time capsule). But why does the information in a time capsule *feels* dynamic rather than static? You will recall my view that qualia are the fact of *being* particular structures within primitive substance. Structure of course has a relational as well as a static aspect, and it may be that the 'feel' of the relational aspect is temporal. It's as if there were a dynamic figure/ ground tension between the substance instantiating the capsules and their unfolding, memory-delimited, structural sequence. Given that persons emerge experientially at the intersection of substance and structure, it's not impossible to intuit that the 'feel' of this dynamism is what we experience as the 'flow of time'. And the delimited nature of each step of the unfolding structure would be central to this. A 'totalised' view would arguably not be experienced as dynamic. David > Brent Meeker wrote: > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > >>Le 09-août-06, à 12:46, 1Z a écrit : > > >> > > >> > > >>>Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist > > >>>does exist, are not well founded empirically. > > >> > > >>So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes > > >>brought by physicists, of "block-universe". > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes, I certainly would! It is unable to explain the subjective > > > passage of time. Dismissing the subjective sensation of the passge of > > > time > > > as "merely subjective" or "illusional" is a surreptitious > > > appeal to dualism and therefore un-physicalistic! > > > > I don't see that problem. In the block universe each subject is modelled as > > having different states at different times and hence subjectively > > experiences the passage of time. > > > That doesn't follow. > > Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence. > Proponents of the Block Universe view believe that there is only a > B-Series. Some think that alone is adequate to explain the subjective > Flow-of-Time. It is easy enough to see how there could be a sequence in > the B series. If we consider a series of 3 dimensional "snapshots" of > someone's brain, each subsequent snapshot iwll contain information > relating back to previous ones. > > > But is this chain or sequence enough to establish flow ? A B-series > without an A-series is like a spatial series. If you had a series of > clones arranged spatially so that clone 2 has all of clone 1's memories > (and more), clone 3 has all of clone 2's memories (and more) and so on, > you would not expect anything to be flowing from one clone to another. > The clones form a series of "time capsules", and a such they have a > natural sequence, but that is all. > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option. > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity. > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness. > > The objection that being arrayed along the 4th dimension would split > consciousness up is week; we don't have a micro-conscousness associated > with each neuron, despite their spatial separation. Why should temporal > separation have ant atomising, fragmenting effect --wehn B-series time > is so similar to space anyway ? > > > > > Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
