Le 15-août-06, à 21:09, David Nyman a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the
>> zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names
>> emerges through the third person pint of view.
> I'm beginning to see that, unnameability apart, it's the 'indexicality'
> of the zero-person point of view that you are reluctant to concede. I
> press you elsewhere on the 'reality' of the number realm. My essential
> point is that I assert the necessary reality of 'indexical David', but
> since I am a merely a 'lens' of the totality - the zero-person point of
> view, the 'gestalt' - then my claim is subsumed in the logically prior
> claim on indexical existence of that point of view - i.e. its necessary
OK (as far as I understand you).
> Hence in logic, if necessary reality is to be postulated as
> deriving from something more 'fundamental', then this must a fortori
> have a logically prior claim on such necessity. If we claim this
> reality to be the number realm, are we not merely conceding it such
> necessity through logical force majeure?
This is unclear. i don't figure out what you are trying to say. You
will have opportunity to explain this. No need to comment directly (but
you can of course).
> Yours in ontic realism
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