Le 15-août-06, à 21:09, David Nyman a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the >> zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names >> emerges through the third person pint of view. > > I'm beginning to see that, unnameability apart, it's the 'indexicality' > of the zero-person point of view that you are reluctant to concede. I > press you elsewhere on the 'reality' of the number realm. My essential > point is that I assert the necessary reality of 'indexical David', but > since I am a merely a 'lens' of the totality - the zero-person point of > view, the 'gestalt' - then my claim is subsumed in the logically prior > claim on indexical existence of that point of view - i.e. its necessary > reality. OK (as far as I understand you). > Hence in logic, if necessary reality is to be postulated as > deriving from something more 'fundamental', then this must a fortori > have a logically prior claim on such necessity. If we claim this > reality to be the number realm, are we not merely conceding it such > necessity through logical force majeure? This is unclear. i don't figure out what you are trying to say. You will have opportunity to explain this. No need to comment directly (but you can of course). > > Yours in ontic realism Really? :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
