Brent Meeker wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > ... > >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system > >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, > > > > > > I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain > > if-then statements. > > > > > >>other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing > >>any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, > >>Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to > >>a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is > >>conscious and the other not. > > > > > > If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically > > identical. > > I don't think I understand this either.
Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon. > Computer programs contain if-then > statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the > program. > But there is no real distinction between data an program. There is a difference between data and process --i.e. running programme. Standard computationalism says mentation (as an activity) is computation (as a process). It is a rare computationalist who think that a spool of tape gathering dust in a cupboardi is mentating. (Not much of a Yes Doctor). > So if you insist > that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the > program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is > implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an > environment. Well, it is divided -- by the programme/process distinction. > I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an > environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I believe > they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing > is > a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings. > > Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
