Hi Peter,

I am no more sure you read the post, nor am I sure you really search 

>> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
>>> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of  existence.
>>> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
>>> the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent,
>>> but their existence isn't.
>> "Their" existence ? Mathematical statements needs "chatty" machines.
> Mathematics proceded for centuries without any machines at all.

Here you don't answer the question. In "their existence" you conflate 
many things making your statement ambiguous. Also I was in the comp 
context, and I was just saying that the mathematical statements need 
the" human machine".

> If AR makes no existential commitments, it cannot lead
> to the existential conclusion that there is no such thing
> as matter.

No scientific theories can prove the non existence of *anything*. I 
have made clear comp just shows that primary matter cannot have 
explanatory purpose. Have you read the Universal Dovetailer Argument?

>> Of course! But that is what I am currently explaining. If you have
>> follow the UDA, then, even if you could not yet be completely 
>> convinced
>> by each steps, you should at least be able to figure out in which 
>> sense
>> "you", here and now, in the "shape" of an OM, to borrow the list
>> vocabulary, exist as a relative number.
> I cna't be persuaded of that without first being
> persuaded that numbers exist.

In which sense? We have already discussed this. I am not using the 
expression "such number exists" in a sense stronger than any 
mathematical user. You are the one adding unnecessary magic here. I am 
such you believe numbers exist. Of course you don't believe in 
"physical numbers", neither I do, giving that "physical" will already 
be a "property" defined by infinities of relations between numbers, 
You are the one assuming some "primary matter" without much precision. 
You told me it has no property of its own, but you never did answer the 
question of how could it could give rise to any property at all.  Where 
does that "primary matter" comes from? Why and how would that suddenly 
explain qualia, and quanta, and more precisely how do you associate 
consciousness to it without introducing actual third person infinities 
(by UDA you can't, unless you throw up comp, that is, unless you do 
introduce actual infinities in the third person description of minds).
(With comp the infinities appears or interfere with the 1-person views 
only, through local probabilities).

If you really want to keep both "standard comp" *and* aristotelian 
materialism/naturalism, you should better find some weakness in the UD 
reasoning. There are subtler points where your criticism could be more 
constructive it seems to me.


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