Bruno Marchal wrote:

> > The other sticking point is, given computationalism
> > is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
> > been arguments
> > that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam,
> > Searle, Moravec)
> > and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal).
> OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like
> me) that we have:
> But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus
> concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I
> conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience.
> Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to
> replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience.

There is a lot more evidence for physical supervenience than there is
computationalism. (There are no fully succesful human-type AI's, for

Computationalism is strongly opposed by some neuroscientists:

> > The discussion about Platonism
> > and the ontological status of mathematical structures, in particular,
> > relates to this
> > second issue. Bruno alludes to it in several papers and posts, and
> > also alludes to his
> > "movie graph argument", but as far as I can tell that argument in its
> > entirety is only
> > available in French.
> That's true. I should do something about that. I don't feel it is so
> urgent in the list because there are more simple problem to tackle
> before, and also, most "MWI", or "Everything"-people can easily imagine
> the UD doesn't need to be run.


How to conclude Platonism by assuming Platonism !

>But this is a subtle problem for those
> who have faith in their uniqueness or in the uniqueness of the world.
> Still you are right, I should write an english version of the movie
> graph.
> Bruno

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