Good questions.  I am bracing for Bruno's reply to include something
about the dependence on Church Thesis and "effective computability" to
put some constraints on S_c, more than finiteness.  My question on the
weakness of the finiteness of S_c was valid even when giving "the
benefit of the doubt" to the doctor and his trustworthiness, and
independent of methods of instantiation.

Tom

David Nyman wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>
>   S_p
> > can be expressed by a finite number, since the substitution itself can
> > be expressed by a finite number (whatever is written on the tape/CD or
> > other storage/transmitting device).
>
> Does your 'interpretation' of 'Yes doctor' leave open all assumptions
> about actual *instantiation* of S_p? You refer above to the 'tape/CD or
> other storage/transmitting device'. Is an additional act of faith
> required such that we trust the doctor not merely to leave S_p to
> gather dust on a shelf? Or, if he does cause the instantiation of S_p
> (even assuming it to be equivalent to S_c) in terms of some
> unconstrained choice among arbitrarily many machine 'architectures'
> (electronic, hydraulic, mechanical, Platonic, you-name-it) I am to
> further trust that my experience will remain invariant to the actual
> physical behaviour thus enacted? Or is the assumption of YD within a
> 'comp' that additionally assumes AR+CT supposed to subsume all the
> above issues, and if so why?
>
> How far do we up the ante here?
>
> David
>
>
> > As I remember it, my interpretation/expansion of the "Yes Doctor"
> > assumption is that 1) there is a (finite of course) level of (digital)
> > substitution (called the "correct level of substitution") that is
> > sufficient to represent "all that I am", and "all that I could be if I
> > hadn't undergone a substitution", and 2) we (including the doctor)
> > cannot know what the correct level of substitution is, therefore we
> > have to gamble that the doctor will get it right when we say "Yes
> > Doctor".
> >
> > Suppose that the level of substitution actually *performed* by the
> > Doctor is S_p.  Denote the *correct* level of substitution S_c.  S_p
> > can be expressed by a finite number, since the substitution itself can
> > be expressed by a finite number (whatever is written on the tape/CD or
> > other storage/transmitting device).  We know what S_p is and it is a
> > *fixed* finite number. But since S_c (*correct* level) is totally
> > unknowable, all we "know" about it is our assumption that it is finite.
> >  The next *obvious* step in the logical process is that the probability
> > that S_p >= S_c is infinitesimal.  I.e. the probability that the doctor
> > got it right is zilch.  This is because most numbers are bigger than
> > any fixed finite number S_p.
> >
> > So it seems that our step of faith in saying Yes Doctor in not well
> > founded.  It's definitely a bad bet.
> >
> > It seems that we need a stronger statement than S_c is finite.
> >
> > Tom
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > Le 21-août-06, à 07:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> > >
> > > >
> > > > It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the
> > > > discussions on
> > > > several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it
> > > > right or wrong?
> > > > This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question
> > > > of faith, in the
> > > > final analysis, as to whether you would accept a digital replacement
> > > > brain or not
> > > > (Bruno's "yes doctor" choice).
> > >
> > > Yes. Unfortunately this gives not a purely operational definition of
> > > comp.
> > > Someone could say yes to the doctor, just thinking that God exists, and
> > > that God is infinitely Good so that he will manage to resuscitate him
> > > through the reconstitution (he believes also God is infinitely
> > > powerful).
> > > So comp is really the belief that you can survive with an artificial
> > > brain *qua computatio", that is, through the respect of some digital
> > > relation only.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > > The other sticking point is, given computationalism
> > > > is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
> > > > been arguments
> > > > that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam,
> > > > Searle, Moravec)
> > > > and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal).
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like
> > > me) that we have:
> > >
> > > NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE
> > >
> > > But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus
> > > concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I
> > > conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience.
> > > Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to
> > > replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience.
> > >
> > >
> > > > The discussion about Platonism
> > > > and the ontological status of mathematical structures, in particular,
> > > > relates to this
> > > > second issue. Bruno alludes to it in several papers and posts, and
> > > > also alludes to his
> > > > "movie graph argument", but as far as I can tell that argument in its
> > > > entirety is only
> > > > available in French.
> > >
> > >
> > > That's true. I should do something about that. I don't feel it is so
> > > urgent in the list because there are more simple problem to tackle
> > > before, and also, most "MWI", or "Everything"-people can easily imagine
> > > the UD doesn't need to be run. But this is a subtle problem for those
> > > who have faith in their uniqueness or in the uniqueness of the world.
> > > Still you are right, I should write an english version of the movie
> > > graph.
> > > 
> > > Bruno
> > > 
> > > 
> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to