1Z wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>The other sticking point is, given computationalism
>>>is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
>>>been arguments
>>>that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam,
>>>Searle, Moravec)
>>>and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal).
>>OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like
>>me) that we have:
>>But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus
>>concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I
>>conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience.
>>Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to
>>replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience.
> There is a lot more evidence for physical supervenience than there is
> for
> computationalism. (There are no fully succesful human-type AI's, for
> instance).

If there were, they'd be implemented on some hardware that interacted causally 
the environment.  Although certainly not of human-type, I'd say that the Mars 
and similar probes realize considerable AI.

Brent Meeker

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