1Z wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>>The other sticking point is, given computationalism >>>is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have >>>been arguments >>>that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam, >>>Searle, Moravec) >>>and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal). >> >> >> >>OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like >>me) that we have: >> >>NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE >> >>But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus >>concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I >>conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience. >>Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to >>replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience. > > > There is a lot more evidence for physical supervenience than there is > for > computationalism. (There are no fully succesful human-type AI's, for > instance).
If there were, they'd be implemented on some hardware that interacted causally with the environment. Although certainly not of human-type, I'd say that the Mars Rovers and similar probes realize considerable AI. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---