Le 21-août-06, à 20:28, Russell Standish a écrit :

> On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 01:32:14PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal writes:
>>>> The other sticking point is, given computationalism
>>>> is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
>>>> been arguments
>>>> that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam,
>>>> Searle, Moravec)
>>>> and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal).
>>> OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows 
>>> (like
>>> me) that we have:
>> That sentence summarises the problem pretty well. We have to agree 
>> that there is this dichotomy before proceeding further, and I don't 
>> think most computationalists do.
> To be sure, this is not how I interpret Maudlin or the movie-graph
> argument. I interpret it as NOT COMP or NOT PHYS SUP or NOT 
> In a multiple universe (eg Everett style MWI), all counterfactuals are
> instantiated as well, so physical supervenience (over all branches) is
> compatible to COMP, and not equivalent to a recording.

This is a very interesting remark, although I am not convinced. I have 
also believed for a while that a material universe could be saved by 
the way the quantum multiverse actualizes the counterfactuals.
But if that were true, consciousness would not supervene on a 
*classical* machine running deterministically an emulation of a 
universal quantum turing itself running my brain, making comp false. 
Your move could belong to what I will perhaps eventually call "the 
magical use of matter for explaining (away) consciousness". That move 
is subtler with respect to the movie-graph, than with respect to the 
seven first step of UDA.
But I think you are correct, and it could be a pedagogical clever idea 
to show first clearly that the movie graph entails (not-comp OR 
not-phys-sup OR many-world), and then to show the perhaps less easy 
point that the concrete primitively material many-world is a red 
herring in this setting.
We should come back on this in a "the 8th step" (movie graph) thread.



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