Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
> > > > > This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or
> > > > > supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is 
> > > > > caused by or supervenes
> > > > > on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could be the other way 
> > > > > around: the GoL pattern
> > > > > supervenes on, or is isomorphic with, the consciousness which resides 
> > > > > in Platonia.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ????
> > >
> > > Well, this is the whole problem we have been discussing these past few 
> > > weeks. The computer
> > > exhibits intelligent behaviour and we conclude that it is probably 
> > > conscious. The physical
> > > states of the computer are clearly the cause of its behaviour, and the 
> > > means whereby we
> > > can observe it or interact with it, but is it correct to say that the 
> > > physical states are the cause
> > > of its *consciousness*?
> >
> > If physicalism is correct, only physical states exist,
> > so yes.
> >
> > > At first glance, the answer is "yes". But what about a computer which
> > > goes through exactly the same physical states as part of a recording, as 
> > > discussed in my other
> > > posts?
> >
> > It won't be exactly the same state, since dispositions and
> > counterfactuals have
> > a physical basis.
>
> A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use as 
> a computer if were not. If
> it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence of 
> physical states.

But here it is not the computation itself that is
recorded, just the input that drives it.

> On run
> no. 1 it could be provided with input from a human, or a true random number 
> generator, for example
> one based on radioactive decay. On run no. 2 it could be provided with a 
> recording of the input from
> run no. 1, so that we know exactly what the computer's responses will be, as 
> surely as we know what
> the behaviour of a tape recording or a clockwork mechanism will be.

That doesn't prove that a recording is the same as a
a computation. What you are talking about is
a computation driven by a recording.

> > >If you say this is not conscious, you have a problem, because identical 
> > >electrical activity
> > > in the computer's circuitry would then on one occasion cause 
> > > consciousness and on another
> > > occasion not.
> >
> > It all depends on what you mean by "activity". The total physical
> > state will be different.
>
> No, it will be exactly the same. The same keystrokes or voice commands are 
> entered the second time
> around from a recording.
>
> > >  If you say it is conscious, then you have to allow that a recording or 
> > > an inputless
> > > machine can be conscious, something many computationalists are loathe to 
> > > do.
> >
> > That depends whether they  are consciousness-computationalists
> > or cognition-computationalists.
>
> It's consciousness which is the more problematic. Many cognitive scientists 
> have traditionally eschewed
> consciousness as unreal, unimportant or too difficult to study.


You haven't shown that a recording per se must have consciousness.

> Stathis Papaioannou
> _________________________________________________________________
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