Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>  I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
> properties as existent.  But I don't understand why one needs a 
> propertyless
> substrate.  Why not just say that some bundles of properties are 
> instantiated and
> some aren't.

I guess Peter needs it for having a notion of (absolute) instantiation. 
If Peter takes the relative notion of instantiation, which is number 
theoretical in nature, then he would loose any motivation for his bare 

>  Anyway, current physical theory is that there is a material
> "substrate" which has properties, e.g. energy, spin, momentum,...

I doubt this. Yes current *interpretations* of physical theories do 
suppose a material substrate, but only for having peaceful sleep (like 
the collapse non-answer in QM). Anyway, the theories does not 
presuppose it. They presuppose only mathematical structure and 
quantitative functor between those mathematical structure and numbers 
that we can measure in some communicable ways.



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