I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being implemented 
every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite computations 
implemented by 
a physical computer or brain. I think this is another way of saying that a 
recording, or 
a single trace of a computation branching in the multiverse, can be conscious. 
To prevent 
a recording being consious yoiu can insist on counterfactual behaviour, but 
that seems an 
ad hoc requirement introduced simply to prevent the "trivial" case of a 
recording or any 
physical system implementing a computation.

Stathis Papaioannou

> Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
> Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2006 15:38:23 +0200
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Le 28-août-06, à 07:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> >
> > Bruno marchal writes:
> >
> >> Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
> >>
> >>>
> >>>> And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
> >>>> complex way, because any physical
> >>>> system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
> >>>> mapping rules,
> >>>
> >>> That is not a fact.
> >>
> >>
> >> It would make sense, indeed, only if the map is computable, and in 
> >> this
> >> case I agree it has not been proved. Again UDA makes such question non
> >> relevant, given that the physical is secondary with respect to the
> >> intelligible.
> >
> > Any computation that can be implemented on a physical system A can be 
> > mapped
> > onto another physical system B, even if B has fewer distinct states 
> > than A, since
> > states can be "reused" for parallel processing. If B is some boring 
> > sysstem such as
> > the ticking of a clock then the "work" (not sure what the best word to 
> > use here is)
> > of implementing the computation lies in the mapping rules, not in the 
> > physical
> > activity. The mapping rules are not actually "implemented": they can 
> > exist written
> > on a piece of paper
> Honestly I am not sure about that.
> > so that an external observer can refer to them and see what
> > the computer is up to, or potentially interact with it. And if the 
> > computer is conscious
> > because someone can potentially talk to it using the piece of paper, 
> > ther is no reason
> > why it should not also be conscious when the piece of paper is 
> > destroyed, or everyone
> > who understands the code on the piece of paper dies. In the limiting 
> > case, the platonic
> > existence of the mapping rule contains all of the computation and the 
> > physical activity
> > is irrelevant - arriving at the same position you do.
> OK, in the case the mapping rule can be coded in a finite way.
> For example I can code the computation of any partial recursive 
> function by using a n-body problem. But a slight change in the initial 
> position of one of the body would destroy the information, and it is 
> not clear why some other *finite* working mapping rule would appear, 
> even in Platonia. Computation is a much constrained notion than people 
> usually realize. You may be right, but I have never seen any proof. The 
> probable reason for this is that such a proof would need a much more 
> formal approach to physics, including what happens in the bottom, but 
> nobody knows what happens there, and current theories makes big 
> simplification there (renormalization, etc.).
> I think that what you say is not totally excluded by string theory, but 
> would be false with loop gravity, for example (in loop gravity 
> everything is quantized, and I can build, if only by diagonalization, 
> computation non mappable to any finite piece of loop-gravity-matter (if 
> I can say).
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> > 

Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to