David Nyman wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > Indeed, but the contingentist doesn't have to regard truth > > as something that exists. > > Fair enough, but even the contingentist needs to express herself > intelligibly without recourse to a constant blizzard of scare quotes. > So she still needs something that FAPP corresponds to 'instantiated > truth', and we can indeed discover such analogs in a contingent world.
Finding something that corresponds to instantiated truth -- such as knowledge -- does not make truth contingent. > > That would indicate that logical possibility is a subset > > of physical possibility, which is counterintuitive. That > > is one motivation for sayign that truth (along with other > > abstracta such as numbers) doesn't exist at all. > > Agreed, with the above proviso. > > > No they couldn't, because they do not refer to external > > contingencies ITFP. Where there is no relation, there > > is no variation. Invariance is necessity. > > Well, at the level of metaphor you are correct, but in a strictly > contingentist sense, they implicitly refer to external contingencies, No. They don't refer at all. Maths isn't empirical. > because 'conceptual' contingencies must be instantiated in terms of > those selfsame 'external' ones. Instantiation isn't reference. > IOW, 'reference', 'externality' and the > entire conceptual armamentarium are instantiated in a given contingent > state of affairs if they are instantiated at all. > and consequently are dependent on it for their > 'logic'. Clearly not, since we are able to concive physically impossible worlds. The virtual "logic" isn't determined by physics. A computer running on real phsyics can simulate a world where graivity is an inverse cube law. > Were these contingencies different, white rabbits might become > quite mundane. Yes. It is logically possible for what is physically (im)possible to have been different. Physical possibillity is a subset of logical possibility. Logical possibility isn't determined by physical possibility. > > You seem to be intent on defining truth in > > the most baggy way possible. > > Yes, but I'm just trying to point out that we can pragmatically deploy > a variety of means to establish agreement to some level of accuracy > without having to believe in the 'transcendent existence' of truth. That is tangential to the discussion. The point is that anti-Plaotonists can agree with Platonists 100% about the mind-independence of mathemaical trth, whilst agreeing 0% about the mind-independent existence of mathematical objects."Transcendent" truth does not have to be sacrificed to ontological contingency. > > > In this > > > view, 'conceptual existence' is just the instantiated existence of a > > > concept. > > > > What has that got to do with truth ? > > Well, the existence of truth is just the instantiated existence of a > truth, in the contingentist view. Actually, I don't really want to push > all this too far. FAPP the distinctions you make are valid, and I'd > much rather agree to deploy a metaphorical sense of the 'existence' of > truth rather than chase about looking for its multifarious > contingentist instantiations. I was originally trying to contrast the > contingent vs. necessary ontic assumptions that seemed to me implicit > in your dialogue with Bruno. As it happens, my own preference lies on > the side of contingency. OK. > Conceptual > > > 'existence' is simply the sum of the instantiations of all (agreed) > > > instances of a concept - IOW they're all apples if we agree they are. > > > Any other view is surely already 'Platonic'? > > > > Nope. > > Why isn't it? Do you mean that we can ascribe metaphorical 'existence' > to a conceptual framework that transcends any or all particular > instantiated examples, without ascribing literal existence to it? In > this case, as with 'truth', I would concur. Mathematical "existence" operates under constraints of logical coherence, non-contradicition, consistency. It is not just a case of conceiving something. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---