David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Indeed, but the contingentist doesn't have to regard truth
> > as something that exists.
> Fair enough, but even the contingentist needs to express herself
> intelligibly without recourse to a constant blizzard of scare quotes.
> So she still needs something that FAPP corresponds to 'instantiated
> truth', and we can indeed discover such analogs in a contingent world.

Finding something that corresponds to instantiated
truth -- such as knowledge -- does not make truth contingent.

> > That would indicate that logical possibility is a subset
> > of physical possibility, which is counterintuitive. That
> > is one motivation for sayign that truth (along with other
> > abstracta such as numbers) doesn't exist at all.
> Agreed, with the above proviso.
> > No they couldn't, because they do not refer to external
> > contingencies ITFP. Where there is no relation, there
> > is no variation. Invariance is necessity.
> Well, at the level of metaphor you are correct, but in a strictly
> contingentist sense, they implicitly refer to external contingencies,

No. They don't refer at all. Maths isn't empirical.

> because 'conceptual' contingencies must be instantiated in terms of
> those selfsame 'external' ones.

Instantiation isn't reference.

>  IOW, 'reference', 'externality' and the
> entire conceptual armamentarium are instantiated in a given contingent
> state of affairs

if they are instantiated at all.

>  and consequently are dependent on it for their
> 'logic'.

Clearly not, since we are able to concive physically
impossible worlds. The virtual "logic" isn't determined
by physics. A computer running on real phsyics can
simulate a world where graivity is an inverse cube law.

> Were these contingencies different, white rabbits might become
> quite mundane.

Yes. It is logically possible for what is physically
(im)possible to have been different. Physical
possibillity is a subset of logical possibility.
Logical possibility isn't determined by physical possibility.

> > You seem to be intent on defining truth in
> > the most baggy way possible.
> Yes, but I'm just trying to point out that we can pragmatically deploy
> a variety of means to establish agreement to some level of accuracy
> without having to believe in the 'transcendent existence' of truth.

That is tangential to the discussion. The point
is that anti-Plaotonists can agree with Platonists
100% about the mind-independence of mathemaical
trth, whilst agreeing 0% about the mind-independent
existence of mathematical objects."Transcendent"  truth does not
have to be sacrificed to ontological contingency.

> > >  In this
> > > view, 'conceptual existence' is just the instantiated existence of a
> > > concept.
> >
> > What has that got to do with truth ?
> Well, the existence of truth is just the instantiated existence of a
> truth, in the contingentist view. Actually, I don't really want to push
> all this too far. FAPP the distinctions you make are valid, and I'd
> much rather agree to deploy a metaphorical sense of the 'existence' of
> truth rather than chase about looking for its multifarious
> contingentist instantiations. I was originally trying to contrast the
> contingent vs. necessary ontic assumptions that seemed to me implicit
> in your dialogue with Bruno. As it happens, my own preference lies on
> the side of contingency.


> Conceptual
> > > 'existence' is simply the sum of the instantiations of all (agreed)
> > > instances of a concept - IOW they're all apples if we agree they are.
> > > Any other view is surely already 'Platonic'?
> >
> > Nope.
> Why isn't it? Do you mean that we can ascribe metaphorical 'existence'
> to a conceptual framework that transcends any or all particular
> instantiated examples, without ascribing literal existence to it? In
> this case, as with 'truth', I would concur.

Mathematical "existence" operates under constraints of logical
non-contradicition, consistency. It is not just a case of conceiving

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