On Mon, Sep 04, 2006 at 03:33:33PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > I don't understand this, for in a Multiverse Klara is no longer an > > inert system. Maudlin's argument relies on Klara being inert, or so I > > thought. > > > You are right. But in a multiverse Klara can be made inert too. Maudlin > could have been much more clear and explicit about this. > In the case Klara would be not inert due to the multiverse, and in the > case this is relevant for consciousness, then it means that the level > of comp has not been well chosen. It would mean that you need to > emulate the quantum computation. You can do this with a classical > universal machine. The computation PI that you get will be far more > complex of course, but it is still a classical computation on which you > can (re)do Maudlin type of argumentation, with new Klaras which will be > inert in this case, as they need to be for the reasoning to proceed. > All right?
I think what you're trying to say is move Maudlin's construction one level up. The computer (eg Klara) actually emulates a Multiverse, and Olympia is some kind of recording of the Multiverse. But in this case I would say that Olympia and Klara are actually identical, and linking the two is not of much conceptual value. I also have difficulty in saying that a Multiverse is conscious when some interior views of the Multiverse experience conscious states. It is the fallacy of assuming that a collection of things is always more (complex) than the individual things themselves. Multiverses are rather simple things - about the simplicity of Schroedinger's equation, and hardly what I'd call conscious. But I think we are headed in the direction of whether computable Multiverses really satisfy what we mean by computationalism. If someone copies the entirety of reality, do I still survive in a "folk" psychology sense. I am still confused on this point. > > This works also for analog quantum machine, unless they need *all > decimals*, but then comp is false, and the UDA reasoning does no more > follow; I don't see that COMP demands the Multiverse be Turing emulable. It is possible for conscious structures to be computable without the environment also being computable. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
