Le 04-sept.-06, à 16:12, 1Z a écrit :

>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly 
>>> experience)
>>> be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
>>> It's a question of consistency.
>>
>> Attributing mind to others explains many things.
>
>
> And the project of expaling things with matter has been going strong
> for
> many centuries.


But if you know the literature in "philosophy of mind" you know that 
the notion of "matter" has never been successful. It has ease the 
progress in *quantitative physics", but only by paying the price of 
hiding the fundamental mind/body question. Of course the fundamental 
questions has been appropriated by the fake-authoritative "religion" 
people. And as I have said often, if you look at the literature in 
physics, primary matter never play an explicit role. It just help to 
interpret formula without jeopardizing common sense.



>
>> There are rich (albeit
>> vague) theories about those other mind (treated in Psychology (cf
>> jealousy, shame, fear, ...) and Theology (does other minds go to
>> paradise?). Although I have no direct experience of other minds I have
>> many indirect evidences.
>
> Yes, that;s the problem. What stands between your mind and
> other minds is your body and other bodies.


Yes. But we can believe in bodies without attributing to them primary 
matters.



>
>> Unexperienced primary matter? I have not even indirect experiences,
>
> No experience of time and change ?


Sure. So what? Time and change can be explained by the third hypostase 
which appears naturally when you define the first person in terms of 
the provability logics.


>
>> and
>> with comp and/or the quantum I can not even ascribe a simple meaning 
>> to
>> the concept.
>
> Quantum mechanics is a theory *of* matter.


Yes. But it is even less a theory of primary matter than Newtonian 
physics, where we can still imagine matter is composed of real "atomos" 
(non splitable entities).

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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