Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Brent meeker writes: > > > > > > > >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a > > > > >>>conscious > > > > >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of > > > > >>>computationalism > > > > >>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements > > > > >>>any conscious > > > > >>>computation as evidence that there is something special and > > > > >>>non-computational > > > > >>>about the brain. Maybe they're right. > > > > >>> > > > > >>>Stathis Papaioannou > > > > >> > > > > >>Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every > > > > >>possible computation > > > > >>(which seems absurd to me)? Then allow that only computations with > > > > >>some special > > > > >>structure are conscious. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that > > > > > only computations > > > > > implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be > > > > > conscious. You need the > > > > > hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a > > > > > God-given programming > > > > > language against which candidate computations can be measured. > > > > > > > > I regard that as a feature - not a bug. :-) > > > > > > > > Disembodied computation doesn't quite seem absurd - but our empirical > > > > sample argues > > > > for embodiment. > > > > > > > > Brent Meeker > > > > > > I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in > > > rather simple cases, > > > like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and > > > it can also be implemented > > > so we can interact with it, as when there is a collection of 5 oranges, > > > or 3 oranges and 2 apples, > > > or 3 pairs of oranges and 2 triplets of apples, and so on, in infinite > > > variety. The difficulty is that if we > > > say that "3+2=5" as exemplified by 3 oranges and 2 apples is conscious, > > > then should we also say > > > that the pairs+triplets of fruit are also conscious? > > > > No, they are only subroutines. > > But a computation is just a lot of subroutines; or equivalently, a > computation is just a subroutine in a larger > computation or subroutine.
The point is that the subroutine does not have the functionality of the programme. > > > If so, where do we draw the line? > > > > At specific structures > > By "structures" do you mean hardware or software? Functional/algorithmic. Whatever software does is also done by hardware. Software is an abstraction ofrm hardware, not something additional. > I don't think it's possible to pin down software structures > without reference to a particular machine and operating system. There is no > natural or God-given language. That isn't the point. I am not thiking of a programme as a sequence of symbols. I am thinking of it as an abstract structure of branches and loops, the sort of thing that is represented by a flowchart. > > > That is what I mean > > > when I say that any computation can map onto any physical system. The > > > physical structure and activity > > > of computer A implementing program a may be completely different to that > > > of computer B implementing > > > program b, but program b may be an emulation of program a, which should > > > make the two machines > > > functionally equivalent and, under computationalism, equivalently > > > conscious. > > > > So ? If the functional equivalence doesn't depend on a > > baroque-reinterpretation, > > where is the problem ? > > Who interprets the meaning of "baroque"? There are objective ways of decifing that kiond of issue, e.g algortihmic information theory. > > > Maybe this is wrong, eg. > > > there is something special about the insulation in the wires of machine > > > A, so that only A can be conscious. > > > But that is no longer computationalism. > > > > No. But what would force that conclusion on us ? Why can't > > consciousness > > attach to features more gneral than hardware, but less general than one > > of your re-interpretations ? > > Because there is no natural or God-given computer architecture or language. Which is prcisely why computationalists should regard consicousness as supervening on a functional structure that could be implemented on a varierty of hardware platofirms and ina variety of langauges. After all, we can talk about a "quicksort" without specifiying whether it is a PC quicksort of a Mac quicksort, and without specifiying whether it is a Pascal quicksort or a Java quicksort. The "right" level of abstraction is very much a part of standard comouter science. > You could say that consciousness > does follow a natural architecture: that of the brain. But that could mean > you would have a zombie if you tried > to copy brain function with a digital computer, or with a digital computer > not running Mr. Gates' operating system. It depends on the level of astraction. I am not saying computationalism is a necessary truth, so it doesn't rebut anything I am saying to point out that functionalism might not succeed. The point is whether there is a level of description that is neither too low (collapsing into physicalism) nor too high (allowing endless arbitrary re-interpretation). --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
