> Colin Hales wrote:
> > >
> > > So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted "as-if" MIND
> > > EXISTED. So far
> > > the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
> > >
> > > Brent Meeker
> > >
> > FIRSTLY
> > Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as
> > this:
> Why not investigate consciousness at the neuronal level rather than
> the fundamental-particle level?
The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
observed with our phenomenal consciousness. That process, for the reasons
that I have been outlining, can never supply a reason why it shall be
necessarily 'like something' to be a cell of a collection of them. That
reason is buried deep in the fabric of things. If you understand the
underlying structure giving rise to phenomenality then the underlying
structure will literally predict the existence, shape, size, behaviour and
interconnectivity of neurons and astrocytes _in order_ that you be
Our logic is all backwards: We need to have a theory predicting brain
material. A theory based on brain material cannot predict brain material,
especially one that has used the property we are trying to find to observe
the brain material. The whole exploratory loop is screwed up.
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