Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > > > > > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > >> >> The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through > >> being > >> >> observed with our phenomenal consciousness. > >> > > >> > Not "only". Cognition and instrumentation are needed too. > >> > >> Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend > >> the causal chain between your phenomenality and the observed phenomena. > >> Provided you can justify the causal source...all is OK... but that's > >> part > >> of the critical argument process using existing knowledge. The observer > >> is > >> fundamentally in the causal chain from the deepest levels all the way > >> through all of the instrumentation and into the sensory systems of the > >> observer. The observer is part of every observation. > > > > Hmmm. Are you sure? Is an earthbound astronomer fundamentally > > part of a supernovca which exploded millionsof years ago ? What > > do you mean by "fundamentally" ? > > > Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest of > scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor..... connect us.
It depends what you , mean by "connect". I am connected to these things, but they can manage without me. It is a one-way kind of connection. > Consider them entropy transactions. When you objectify it, formalise it > and it looks (is equivalent to) 'light cone' causal proximity, but that's > only how it appearas. > Causal chains all the way from the sub-sub-quark level, all the way out of > the experiment, up through the instruments, across the room, into your > eye, action potentials along nerves and then the neuron(s) that deliver > the qualia... observation. > > >> Consciousness is not a 'high level' emergent property of massive numbers > >> of neurons in a cortex context. It is a fundamental property of matter > >> that single excitable cells make good use of that is automatically > >> assembled along with assembling cells in certain ways. > > > > There are a number of leaps there. from "basal" areas > > to "single neurons", for instance. > > When you look at the imaging it's very small cohorts of neurons. They look > identical to other sorts of neuron cohorts nearby. One set delivers > qualia. The others do not. How do you know ? > So there are 2 parts to an explanation: > a) single neuron properties > b) cohort organisation > > Unless thesre is a property of single neurons to use for a cohort to do > something with, you are attributing 'magical emergence' to a cohort. This > is a logical inevitability. y-e-e-s. But where are you without emergence ? Qualia would then be properties of quarks. Wihich brings on a Grain problem with a vengeance. > Magical emergence means attributing some sort of property inherent in > organisation itself. The point of emergence is rather that the property is *not* inherent in the lower-level parts and realtions. > This leads to logical nonsense in other > considerations of organisation (eg sentient plumbing in Beijing). > > That leaves us with a property of excitable cells which can > a) be optionally established by a single cell > then > b) be used to collective effect (including cancellation/nullification) A phenomenal property of a single cell would be emergent relative to the molecular/atomic level. > At this stage I don;t know which option does the priordial emptions. What > I do know is that without single cell expression of a kind of > 'elemental-quale' you can't make qualia. > > Crick and Koch also attributed qualia to small cohorts or possibly single > cells (but in cortical material in 2003). No we have moved it out of the > cortext, the arrow is pointing towards single cells... and what do you > know? they are all different - 'excitable' = electromagnetic behaviour. We > have a fairly large pointer which says this is a single cell > electromagnetic phenomenon as like a pixel in a qualia picture. > > colin hales --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---