Bruno Marchal writes:

> > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes 
> > on no
> > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object -
> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be 
> careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we 
> are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. This would be a mistake 
> only second to Aristotle reification of the notion of matter
> > but it is also consistent
> > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, 
> > and that
> > perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single 
> > quantum state
> > there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant 
> > compared to
> > the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to 
> > eliminate it
> > completely.
> I think you are right, but it seems to me that at that point (still 
> more after the translation of the UDA in arithmetic) to really believe 
> that a recording can have all consciousness experiences would be like 
> to believe that, despite the thermodynamical explanation, cars are 
> still pull by (invisible) horses. In any *applied* math there is an 
> unavoidable use of Ockham razor. The movie graph or Maudlin's Olympia 
> makes it as minimal as possible.

It seems there is a contest of absurdities: that consciousness can supervene on 
a recording, or any physical process, or no physical process. Maudlin 
thinks all of these are absurd, you think the first two are absurd but not the 
I think all three are equally... a little bit absurd, but not absurd enough to 
off computationalism as the best theory of consciousness.

Stathis Papaioannou
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