Russell Standish writes:
> On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > For how would a1/a1b1
> > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of
> > the multiverse?
> Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more
> absurd than saying recordings can be conscious.
Perhaps you are right, but the simplest position seems to me to be that if a
machine is conscious
with all its fellows in the multiverse implementing the counterfactuals, it
should also be conscious
if all the other machines did not exist. What you have argued is that a
mechanism for handling
counterfactuals which is apparently inert and irrelevant on a particular run is
actually neither if
the MWI is true, because the presence of the mechanism ensures that the
realised in other branches. This means that a machine with such a mechanism in
place (i.e., a
machine that is not a recording) has a varied and first person indeterminate
future ahead of it.
However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the
consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living
through a virtual
reality replay of something recorded yesterday? I could try to confound the
performing an unpredictable act, but no matter how hard I tried I could not
surprise an external
observer in the know any more than I could surprise my reflection in the
mirrror with a sudden
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