David Nyman wrote:
> On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense,
> > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any
> > way.
> Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this
> particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably,
> entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that
> Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and
> unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of
> assumptions involving numbers and their relations.

Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be.

>  As he often
> reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive
> explanatory truth,

He claims that computationalism is incompatible with
materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS)

> and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' -
> limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines
> and discovering their povs.

So how does he get "computationalism is incompatible with
materialism" out of such interviews?

> In achieving these results, AFAICS, no
> claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers:
> rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the
> normal way.

How can he come to conclusions about the uneality
of matter without assuming the reality of something
to take its place?

> The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we
> go about our daily affairs is of course another issue.

And yet antoher issue is whether the conclusions of
a valid arguiment must be contained in its premises.

> It may of course
> eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically
> disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to
> force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions -
> e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition.

Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That
is an assumption beyond computationalism.

> But as Bruno is again at
> pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will
> always entail some 'act of faith'.
> To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to
> knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult,

No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not
be writing this. What you mean is to
establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult.
Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim.

> and perhaps at
> root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the
> computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic
> reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or
> computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory
> commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and
> relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what
> else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data
> at our disposal?
> David
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > There is no need to reify the numbers.[...]
> >
> > > I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is
> > > independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be
> > > explained quite precisely why "numbers" (in a third person view-view)
> > > are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality
> > > and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't been 
> > > reified in any sense,
> > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any
> > way.

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