Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Sorry for the comment delay.
> Le 23-oct.-06, à 16:49, David Nyman a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> >>> prove Platonism.
> >> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
> >> by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR"
> >> statements.
> > Lest we go yet another round in the 'reification' debate, is it not
> > possible to reconcile what is being claimed here?
> > Bruno, I'm assuming that when you eschew 'Platonic existence' for AR,
> > you are thereby saying that your project is to formalise certain
> > arguments about the logical structure of possibility - and through
> > this, to put actuality to the test in certain empirical aspects.
> Yes. Although people are so often wrong on what "formalization"
> consists in, that I prefer to say that I just interview a machine.
> > Questions of how this may finally be reconciled with 'RITSIAR' (I hope
> > you recall what this means) are in abeyance.
> I don't recall what RITSIAR means. Nor BU.
"Real in the sense that I am real"
> > Nevertheless, some aspect
> > of this approach may ultimately be ascribed a status as 'foundational
> > existent' analogous to that of 'primary matter' in materialism.
> I don't think so. This would lead to a reification of numbers, which I
> think is just a little bit less meaningless than reifying matter. But
> still fundamentally wrong.
If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
> > Alternatively, such a hypothesis may be shown to be redundant or
> > incoherent.
> Not really. It is SWE which should be made redundant.
> > Peter, as we've agreed, materialism is also metaphysics, and as a route
> > to 'ultimate reality' via a physics of observables, is vulnerable to
> > 'reification'. Might it not be premature to finalise precisely what it
> > is that physical theory decribes that might actually be RITSIAR?
I have answered these questions before: but
1. Contingent existence.
2. The ability to causally interact
3. A primary substance which endures through change ( explaining
dynamic, non-BU time)
4. Optionally, the ability to explain phenomenal consiousness in a
basically non-mathematical way.(Property dualism)
> > may be tempted to respond, Johnsonianly, that it is precisely the world
> > that kicks back that is RITSIAR, but theoretical physics and COMP are
> > both in the business of modelling what is not so directly accessible.
> > This notwithstanding that we may believe one or other theory to be
> > further developed, more widely accepted, or better supported
> > empirically. Or is there some irreducible sense in which 'primary
> > matter' could be deemed to exist in a way that nothing else can?
> Note that "consciousness" can be deemed to exist in a way that nothing
> else can. In particular "consciousness of numbers".
> But "Primary Matter", Ether, Phlogiston, Vital Principle, .... I doubt
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