Peter Jones writes:

> > I suppose you could say that there is no feeling of continuity from one 
> > microsecond to the next in a normally functioning brain either, because it 
> > takes many microseconds to make a thought. My point is that whatever it 
> > takes to make a thought and however vague the distinction between one 
> > thought and the next is, arbitrarily slicing up the physical activity 
> > underlying consciousness should not make a difference to the sense of 
> > continuity,
> Should not, assuming physicalism? Should not, assuming
> computationalism?

Assuming a minimal form of functionalism: that at the very least, a perfect 
physical copy of a person will behave, think and have the same kinds of mental 
states as the original. A computationalist would add that a computer analogue 
of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more 
> > and no explicit ordering is necessary. The counting sequence "one, two, 
> > three" may involve millions of slices of brain activity or computer 
> > emulation activity spread throughout space and time, and it may take many 
> > of these slices to form a moment of consciousness just as it takes many 
> > milliseconds of normal brain activity to form a moment of consciousness, 
> > but the feeling of continuity should be preserved.
> Why? Maybe it supervenes on whatever propels one physical state
> to evolve into another.

A perfect copy will include that as well. A perfect copy of a mechanical clock 
will include the same position of the hands and gears, the same geometry, 
metallurgy and tension in the spring, the same amount of oxidation on each 
metal part, and every other detail the same. Do you think it is possible that 
such a copy would not show or keep the same time even though it is physically 
exactly identical?

Stathis Papaioannou
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