Le Vendredi 24 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
> Now that there is a definite role of consciousness (access to novelty),
> the statement 'functional equivalent' makes the original 'philosophical
> zombie' an oxymoron...

But functionnal equivalence is a requisite ! By definition, a zombie is 
a "creature" which acts and looks like any other conscious creature (human), 
who's behavior is undistinguishable from a real person but yet lacks any 
conscious experience. What this statement says is that you should accept one 
of these propositions :

1) Consciousness is not tied to a given behavior nor to a given physical 
attribute, replicating these does not give consciousness. (dualism)

2) Zombies are impossible, if you do a functionnaly identical being, it will 
be conscious. (physicalism or computationalism)

> the first premise of 'functional equivalence' is 
> wrong. The zombie can't possibly be functionally identical without
> consciousness, which stops it being a zombie!

As I see that you accept point 2) then I don't understand why you continue to 
see any explanatory power to the zombie concept.

> To move forward, the 'breed' of the zombie in the paper is not merely
> 'functionally identical'. That requirement is relaxed. Instead it is
> physically identical in all respects except the brain. 

It is not a zombie then (not the philosophical zombie we're talking about). 
What you're doing is taking the premices that the "supposed" zombie is not 
functionnaly identical (because that's how you differentiate it from 
the "real" scientist) and then taking as conclusion that they aren't 
functionnaly identical to "real" scientist... iow it is false because it is 

> This choice is 
> justified empirically - the brain is known to be where it happens. Then
> there is an exploration of the difference between the human and zombie
> brains that could account for why/how one is conscious and the other is
> not. 

The point shows that functionnal equivalence leads to consciousness or 
you should be dualist.


Quentin Anciaux

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