Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >>> If all you have is a bunch of numbers (or 4-20mA current loop >>> signals or 1-5V signals) dancing away, and you have no >>> a-priori knowledge of the external world, how are you to >>> create any sort of model of the external world in the first >>> place? You don't even know it is there. That is the world >>> devoid of phenomenal consciousness. >> You could say exactly same thing about a bunch of neurons and chemicals. > Yet they produce consciousness. > > Yes. Neurons and their chemicals do contrive to construct phenomenal > scenes. The question to ask yourslef is what is different about their > circumstance that this be so? Or better..what is missing from my way of > thinking that has me unable to imagine how neuron behaviour can produce > such a thing - and what is the difference between that and wired signals, > numbers and rules? > >>> If humans give you a model. You still don't know what it is about. >>> It's just a bunch of rules (when this input does this, do that... >>> and so on). None of which is an experience. None of which gives >>> you any innate awareness of the external world. >> If you can learn and act you do know what it is about. >> You're just making an assertion that none of it is >> experience or innate awareness. > > Hmmm. OK. So you're 'learning', are you? What rules of learning are there > and how did you get them? How do you 'know' what appropriate action to > take? Rules for learning are rules like the others. Tell me how a system > devoid of a phenomenal representation of the external world could ever > form a representation of the external world without knowing how to do that > already.
a) Darwinian evolution b) genetic learning algorithm. > >>> That's why a real phenomenon happening in your head that innately > connects to the real phenomemona in the external natural world >>> and constructs an experienced representation of it, devoid of >>> all knowledge 'about it',is necessary before you can know >>> anything "about" it _at all_. >> Unsupported assertion. > > OK...want proof? Let's do a test. You are a scientist. You are about to do > science on a coffee cup in front of you. Close your eyes. > > Now explain how you could possibly be as scientifically broad/adept in > your description of coffee cups. (Meanwhile I have filled the coffee cup > with acid, something of which you are completely unaware). The whole > phenomenal scene connecting you with the external world is GONE. What more > support do you want? What more is possible before a simple statement such > as the one I make above becomes reasonable? Nonsense. On you're theory blind people aren't conscious. And there are even a few blind scientists. The support I want is one that isn't hand waving and assertions. > > Or, put it another way...exactly what is it that you are asserting acts in > its place? Maybe you could tell me what that is I might understand. > >>> There is a natural tendency to anthropomorphise our experiences >>> into the artifact. Imagine yourself in a black silent room with >>> a bunch of numbers streaming by and a bunch of dials you can >>> use to send numbers back out. Now tell me how you can ever deduce >>> the real external world from all those numbers. You can't. >>> You can say 'when I poke this dial that number over there does >>> that'. That is your whole universe. You have to stop thinking >>> like a human and really imagine 'what it is like' to be a zombie. >> To imagine is to create an internal model - so imagining what it >> is like to be a zombie seems to be a contradiction in terms. >> >> Brent Meeker > > Erm.... I am trying to convey what it is like to be a human contrasted > with a zombie. YES...I am using human imagination to do that. You can't > use that back against me... please try to do the imagining I suggest > instead of criticising the attempt. I KNOW humans have imagination and > zombies don't...sheesh! cut me some slack here! > > OK....If you like then....consider this bit > >>> Imagine yourself in a black silent room with >>> a bunch of numbers streaming by and a bunch >>> of dials you can use to send numbers back out. > > Delete all that as well. NOTHING. No awaness of even the numbers. For that > is what the zombie has...even worse. No awareness even of its own sensing. > nothing. Now put yourself in the zombie's shoes for a while. You just referring to the definition of "zombie" as not having consciousness. Let me see if I can repeat your argument: 1) A zombie has no internal narrative (i.e. "phenomenal consciousness"). Functionally, it just manipulates inputs and produces outputs. 2) I can't imagine doing science without an inner narrative. 3) (1) and (2) entail that a zombie a can't do science. 4) A digital computer just manipulates inputs and produces outputs. 5) Therefore a digital computer is necessarily a zombie. Is that it? Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---