Le Dimanche 26 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : <SNIP> > What point is there in bothering with it. The philosophical zombie is > ASSUMED to be equivalent! This is failure before you even start! It's > wrong and it's proven wrong because there is a conclusively logically and > empirically provable function that the zombie cannot possibly do without > phenomenality: SCIENCE. The philosophical zombie would have to know > everything a-priori, which makes science meaningless. There is no novelty > to a philosophical zombie. It would have to anticipate all forms of > randomness or chaotic behaviour.... NUTS.
But that's exactly what all the arguments is about !! Either identical functionnal behavior entails consciousness either there is some magical property needed plus identical functionnal behavior to entails consciousness. > This is failure before you even start! But the point is to assume this "nonsense" to take a "conclusion", to see where it leads. Why imagine a "possible" zombie which is functionnally identical if there weren't any dualistic view in the first place ! Only in dualistic framework it is possible to imagine a functionnally equivalent to human yet lacking consciousness, the other way is that functionnally equivalence *requires* consciousness (you can't have functionnally equivalence without consciousness). > This is failure before you even start! That's what you're doing... you haven't prove that zombie can't do science because the "zombie" point is not on what they can do or not, it is the fact that either acting like we act (human way) entails necessarily to have consciousness or it does not (meaning that there exists an extra property beyond behavior, an extra thing undetectable from seeing/living/speaking/... with the "zombie" that gives rise to consciousness)L. You haven't prove that zombie can't do science because you tells it at the starting of the argument. The argument should be weither or not it is possible to have a *complete* *functionnal* (human) replica yet lacking consciousness. Quentin --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---