Le Mardi 28 Novembre 2006 00:00, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux writes:
> > But the point is to assume this "nonsense" to take a "conclusion", to see
> > where it leads. Why imagine a "possible" zombie which is functionnally
> > identical if there weren't any dualistic view in the first place ! Only
> > in dualistic framework it is possible to imagine a functionnally
> > equivalent to human yet lacking consciousness, the other way is that
> > functionnally equivalence *requires* consciousness (you can't have
> > functionnally equivalence without consciousness).
> I think it is logically possible to have functional equivalence but
> structural difference with consequently difference in conscious state even
> though external behaviour is the same.
> Stathis Papaioannou
Do you mean you can have exact human external behavior replica without
consciousness ? or with a different consciousness (than a human) ?
If 1st case then if you can't find any difference between a real human and the
replica lacking consciousness how could you tell the replica is lacking
consciouness (or that the human have consciousness) ?
If the second case, I don't understand what could be a different
consciousness, could you elaborate ?
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