David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > But PC isn't *extra* information It is a re-presentation of
> > what is coming in through the senses by 3rd person mechanisms.
> How can you be confident of that?
Because phenomenal perception wouldn't be perception otherwise.
Non-phenomenal sense data (pulse trains, etc) has to co-vary with
external events, or it is a useless as a guide to what is going on
your head. Likewise, the phenomenal re-presentation has
to co-vary with the data. And if A co-varies with
B, A contains essentially the same information as B. If PC were
a "free variable", it would not present, or re-present anything outside
> We can see that transactional
> information arrives in the brain and is processed in a 3-person
> describable manner. We don't have the glimmer of a theory of how this
> could of itself produce anything remotely like PC, or indeed more
> fundamentally account for the existence of any non-3-personal 'pov'
"How", no. But when PC is part of perception, that sets
constraints on *what* is happening.
> What I'm suggesting is that 'phenomenality' is inherently
> bound up with instantiation, and that it thereby embodies (literally)
> information that is inaccessible from the 3-person (i.e. disembodied)
Information about how information is embodied (this is a first folio
of Shakespeare, that is CDROM of Shakespeare) is always
"extra". However, if the information itself is "extra", therr is no
> This is why 'qualia' aren't 'out there'. Of course this doesn't
> imply that electrons are conscious or whatever, because the typical
> content and 'grasp' of PC would emerge at vastly higher-order levels of
> organisation. But my point is that *instantiation* makes the difference
> - the world looks *like* something (actually, like *me*) to an
> instantiated entity, but not like anything (obviously) to a
> non-instantiated entity.
> PZs, as traditionally conceived, are precisely that - non-instantiated,
> abstract, and hence not 'like' anything at all.
Huh? PZ's are supposed to be physical.
> The difference between
> a PZ and a traditionally-duplicated PC human is that we *can't help*
> but get the phenomenality when we follow the traditional process of
> constructing people. But a purely 3-person functional theory doesn't
> tell us how. And consequently we can't find a purely functional
> *substitution level* that is guaranteed to produce PC, except by
> physical duplication. Or - as in the 'yes doctor' gamble - by observing
> the behaviour of the entity and drawing our own conclusions.
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