Quentin Anciaux writes:
> Le Mardi 28 Novembre 2006 00:00, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> > Quentin Anciaux writes:
> > > But the point is to assume this "nonsense" to take a "conclusion", to see
> > > where it leads. Why imagine a "possible" zombie which is functionnally
> > > identical if there weren't any dualistic view in the first place ! Only
> > > in dualistic framework it is possible to imagine a functionnally
> > > equivalent to human yet lacking consciousness, the other way is that
> > > functionnally equivalence *requires* consciousness (you can't have
> > > functionnally equivalence without consciousness).
> > I think it is logically possible to have functional equivalence but
> > structural difference with consequently difference in conscious state even
> > though external behaviour is the same.
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> Do you mean you can have exact human external behavior replica without
> consciousness ? or with a different consciousness (than a human) ?
> If 1st case then if you can't find any difference between a real human and
> replica lacking consciousness how could you tell the replica is lacking
> consciouness (or that the human have consciousness) ?
> If the second case, I don't understand what could be a different
> consciousness, could you elaborate ?
See my answer to Colin on this point. I assume that you are conscious in much
way I am because (roughly speaking) you have a similar brain to mine *and* your
behaviour is similar to mine. If only one of us were conscious we would have to
magic to explain it: God has decided to give only one of us an immaterial,
soul which does not make any difference to behaviour.
On the other hand, if it turns out that you are an alien robot designed to fool
thinking you are human, based on technology utterly different to that in a
it is not unreasonable to wonder whether you are conscious at all, or if you
your conscious experience is anything like a human's.
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