Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Colin Hales writes: > >>> I think it is logically possible to have functional equivalence but >>> structural >>> difference with consequently difference in conscious state even though >>> external behaviour is the same. >>> >>> Stathis Papaioannou >> Remember Dave Chalmers with his 'silicon replacement' zombie papers? (a) >> Replace every neuron with a silicon "functional equivalent" and (b) hold >> the external behaviour identical. > > I would guess that such a 1-for-1 replacement brain would in fact have the > same > PC as the biological original, although this si not a logical certainty. But > what I was > thinking of was the equivalent of copying the "look and feel" of a piece of > software > without having access to the source code. Computers may one day be able to > copy > the "look and feel" of a human not by directly modelling neurons but by > completely > different mechanisms. Even if such computers were conscious, there seems no > good > reason to assume that their experiences would be similar to those of a > similarly > behaving human. > >> If the 'structural difference' (accounting for consciousness) has a >> critical role in function then the assumption of identical external >> behaviour is logically flawed. This is the 'philosophical zombie'. Holding >> the behaviour to be the same is a meaninglesss impossibility in this >> circumstance. > > We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to > consciousness but > not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal. > >> In the case of Chalmers silicon replacement it assumes that everything >> that was being done by the neuron is duplicated. What the silicon model >> assumes is a) that we know everything there is to know and b) that silicon >> replacement/modelling/representation is capable of delivering everything, >> even if we did 'know everything' and put it in the model. Bad, bad, >> arrogant assumptions. > > Well, it might just not work, and you end up with an idiot who slobbers and > stares into > space. Or you might end up with someone who can do calculations really well > but displays > no emotions. But it's a thought experiment: suppose you use whatever advanced > technology > it takes to create a being with *exactly* the same behaviours as a biological > human. Can > you be sure that this being would be conscious? Can you be sure that this > being would be > conscious in the same way you and I are conscious?
Consciousness would be supported by the behavioral evidence. If it were functionally similar at a low level I don't see what evidence there would be against it. So the best conclusion would be that the being was conscious. If we knew a lot about the function of the human brain and we created this behaviorally identical being but with different functional structure; then we would have some evidence against the being having human type consciousness - but I think we'd be able to assert that it was not conscious in some way. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---