Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>> <snip>
>>> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to 
>>> consciousness but
>>> not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal.
>> Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is 
>> substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF 
>> she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a 
>> (1-person) spectrum reversal.
>> Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the 
>> color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original, 
>> she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!).
>> So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This means 
>> that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum reversal, 
>> but obviously there is no 3-description of it either ....
>> So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take an 
>> incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum 
>> reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying 
>> something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay her 
>> doctor bill (but this is a different  external behaviour, ok?)
> I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd person 
> behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean copying 
> a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified for 
> ordinary 
> day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level which 
> preserves 
> 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, suppose 
> you carried around with you a device which monitored all your behaviour in 
> great 
> detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your actual 
> behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device might 
> be 
> able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take over 
> control of 
> your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the 
> substitution 
> had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether this 
> copy 
> experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to be 
> blue as 
> you do before the substitution.

That's a precis of Greg Egan's short story "The Jewel".  I wouldn't call it 
unreasonable to wonder whether the copy experiences the same qualia, but I'd 
call it unreasonable to conclude that it did not on the stated evidence.  In 
fact I find it hard to think of what evidence would count against it have some 
kind of qualia.

Brent Meeker

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