Hal Ruhl wrote:
> I have tried to find material discussing the following idea but have
> not found any yet so I would appreciate comments.
> The idea is based in the description of objects.
> It was recently pointed out to me as being an aspect of my model by
> Alastair Malcolm.
> The idea is presented below and its result appears to be to exclude
> continuums from universes.
> 1) There is a list of all possible properties of objects.
The above object #1 is countable by definition.
> 2) The list and all its sublists are the descriptions of all possible objects.
The above object #2 is uncountable by Cantor's diagonal argument. It
is the power set of the first list. It is not a list.
> By Cantor's diagonal argument lists can be no more than countably
> infinite in length.
> An object's spacial coordinates are part of its description [its
> sublist] but because the full list is at most only countably infinite
> in length there can not be a continuum of spacial coordinates on
> it. The same would apply to an object's time coordinates.
If you assume that space and/or time is a continuum, then there exists
an uncountable set of space and/or time coordinates, even in every
interval of non-zero measure. But if you take a particular object, as
you are doing here, which has one set of space-time coordinate
(4-tuple), this is describable with a countable set of symbols. Yes,
assuming a space-time continuum that is really a continuum is rather
hard to believe, as Feynman pointed out (at one point in his life ;).
But as I have been trying to point out, this kind of belief is
something that we do without thinking about it. And yet it is faith.
It is based on evidence, a finite set of points of evidence, but it
takes faith to integrate over those points.
> Universes are objects described by sub lists of the full list and
> consist of sets of other sub lists but as such universes can not
> contain continuums of spacial or temporal coordinates or continuums
> of any other property its objects might have.
> As an aside, in my current model the full list and its sub lists are
> both description and object. Objects interact by mutually
> changing just one property - their location on a Physical Reality
> dimension. The change is just a shifting of boundaries between sublists.
> Hal Ruhl
Perhaps this is a good new angle to try to say what I'm trying to say.
If there is ultimately no such thing as a person, then there is no
subject-object distinction (needed for science, and even more for
scientists). This is talking at the deepest level of philosophy, not
the common sense (sometimes the word naive is used) sense that is used
in everyday science. I think it is best to always look at the whole
week (the living of everyday life at the finite level) from the
perspective of the weekend (personal eternity, the grand scheme of
things which the impersonal Everything does not provide). The only way
to the continuum is to start with it. No amount of making lists is
going to get you there.
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