Brent meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >>> I assume that there is some copy of me possible which preserves
> >>> my 1st person experience. After all, physical copying literally
> >>> occurs in the course of normal life and I still feel myself to be
> >>> the same person. But suppose I am offered some artificial means
> >>> of being copied. The evidence I am presented with is that Fred2
> >>> here is a robot who behaves exactly the same as the standard
> >>> human Fred: has all his memories, a similar personality, similar
> >>> intellectual abilities, and passes whatever other tests one cares
> >>> to set him. The question is, how can I be sure that Fred2 really
> >>> has the same 1st person experiences as Fred? A software engineer
> >>> might copy a program's "look and feel" without knowing anything
> >>> about the original program's internal code, his goal being to
> >>> mimic the external appearance as seen by the end user by whatever
> >>> means available. Similarly with Fred2, although the hope was to
> >>> produce a copy with the same 1st person experiences, the only
> >>> possible research method would have been to produce a copy that
> >>> mimics Fred's behaviour. If Fred2 has 1st person experiences at
> >>> all, they may be utterly unlike those of Fred. Fred2 may even be
> >>> aware that he is different but be extremely good at hiding it,
> >>> because if he were not he would have been rejected in the testing
> >>> process.
> >>> If it could be shown that Fred2 behaves like Fred *and* is
> >>> structurally similar
> >> Or *functionally* similar at lower levels, e.g. having long and
> >> short-term memory, having reflexes, having mostly separate areas
> >> for language and vision.
> >>> to Fred then I would be more confident in accepting copying. If
> >>> behaviour is similar but the underlying mechanism completely
> >>> different then I would consider that only by accident could 1st
> >>> person experience be similar.
> >> I'd say that would still be the way to bet - just with less
> >> confidence.
> >> Brent Meeker
> > It's the level of confidence which is the issue. Would it be fair to
> > assume that a digital and an analogue audio source have the same 1st
> > person experience (such as it may be) because their output signal is
> > indistinguishable to human hearing and scientific instruments?
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> "Fair" is a vague term. That they are the same would be my default
> assumption, absent any other information. Of course knowing that one is
> analog and the other digital reduces my confidence in that assumption, but no
> theory of "audio source experience" I have no way to form a specific
> alternative hypothesis.
You're implying that the default assumption should be that consciousness
correlates more closely with external behaviour than with internal activity
generating the behaviour: the tape recorder should reason that as the CD player
produces the same audio output as I do, most likely it has the same experiences
as I do. But why shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even though the CD player
produces the same output as I do, it does so using completely different
technology, so it most likely has completely different experiences to my own.
Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at