Brent meeker writes:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> > 
> >>> I assume that there is some copy of me possible which preserves
> >>> my 1st person experience. After all, physical copying literally
> >>> occurs in the course of normal life and I still feel myself to be
> >>> the same person. But suppose I am offered some artificial means
> >>> of being copied. The evidence I am presented with is that Fred2
> >>> here is a robot who behaves exactly the same as the standard
> >>> human Fred: has all his memories, a similar personality, similar
> >>> intellectual abilities, and passes whatever other tests one cares
> >>> to set him. The question is, how can I be sure that Fred2 really
> >>> has the same 1st person experiences as Fred? A software engineer
> >>> might copy a program's "look and feel" without knowing anything
> >>> about the original program's internal code, his goal being to
> >>> mimic the external appearance as seen by the end user by whatever
> >>> means available. Similarly with Fred2, although the hope was to
> >>> produce a copy with the same 1st person experiences, the only
> >>> possible research method would have been to produce a copy that
> >>> mimics Fred's behaviour. If Fred2 has 1st person experiences at
> >>> all, they may be utterly unlike those of Fred. Fred2 may even be
> >>> aware that he is different but be extremely good at hiding it,
> >>> because if he were not he would have been rejected in the testing
> >>> process.
> >>> 
> >>> If it could be shown that Fred2 behaves like Fred *and* is 
> >>> structurally similar
> >> Or *functionally* similar at lower levels, e.g. having long and
> >> short-term memory, having reflexes, having mostly separate areas
> >> for language and vision.
> >> 
> >>> to Fred then I would be more confident in accepting copying. If
> >>> behaviour is similar but the underlying mechanism completely
> >>> different then I would consider that only by accident could 1st
> >>> person experience be similar.
> >> I'd say that would still be the way to bet - just with less
> >> confidence.
> >> 
> >> Brent Meeker
> > 
> > It's the level of confidence which is the issue. Would it be fair to
> > assume that a digital and an analogue audio source have the same 1st
> > person experience (such as it may be) because their output signal is
> > indistinguishable to human hearing and scientific instruments?
> > 
> > Stathis Papaioannou 
> 
> "Fair" is a vague term.  That they are the same would be my default 
> assumption, absent any other information.  Of course knowing that one is 
> analog and the other digital reduces my confidence in that assumption, but no 
> theory of "audio source experience" I have no way to form a specific 
> alternative hypothesis.

You're implying that the default assumption should be that consciousness 
correlates more closely with external behaviour than with internal activity 
generating the behaviour: the tape recorder should reason that as the CD player 
produces the same audio output as I do, most likely it has the same experiences 
as I do. But why shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even though the CD player 
produces the same output as I do, it does so using completely different 
technology, so it most likely has completely different experiences to my own. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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