Hi Quentin,
> Hi Stathis,
> Le Mercredi 6 Décembre 2006 10:23, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> > Brent meeker writes:
> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > "Fair" is a vague term.  That they are the same would be my default
> > > assumption, absent any other information.  Of course knowing that one is
> > > analog and the other digital reduces my confidence in that assumption,
> > > but no theory of "audio source experience" I have no way to form a
> > > specific alternative hypothesis.
> >
> > You're implying that the default assumption should be that consciousness
> > correlates more closely with external behaviour than with internal activity
> > generating the behaviour: the tape recorder should reason that as the CD
> > player produces the same audio output as I do, most likely it has the same
> > experiences as I do. But why shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even
> > though the CD player produces the same output as I do, it does so using
> > completely different technology, so it most likely has completely different
> > experiences to my own.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> A tape recorder or a CD has no external behavior that would mimic a human. 
> But 
> I really think that if you have same external behavior than a human then 
> the "copy" (whathever it is made of) will be conscious. Exact replica means 
> you can talk with the replica, learn, etc... It's not just sound (and or 
> move). Even If I knew that the "brain" copy was made of smashed apples it 
> would not change my "mind" ;) about it. The only "evidence" of others 
> consciousness is behavior, social interactions, ... You could scan a brain, 
> yet you won't see consciousness.

The tape recorder/ CD player example was to show that two entities may have 
similar behaviour generated by completely different mechanisms. As you say, we 
can see the brain, we can see the behaviour, but we *deduce* the consciousness, 
unless it is our own. If someone has similar behaviour generated by a similar 
brain, then you would have to invoke magical processes to explain why he would 
not also have similar consciousness. But if someone has similar behaviour with 
a very different brain, I don't think there is anything in the laws of nature 
which says that he has to have the same consciousness, even if you say that he 
must have *some* sort of consciousness.

> Another thing that puzzles me is that consciousness should be generated by 
> physical (and chemicals which is also "physical") activities of the brain, 
> yet I feel my consciousness (in fact me) is located in the upper front of my 
> skull... Why then neurons located in the back of my brain do not generate 
> conscious feeling ? And if they do participate, why am I located in the front 
> of my brain ? Why this location ? Why only a tiny part of the brain feels 
> conscious activities ?

That's just what our brains make us think. If our brains were slightly 
different our consciousness could seem to be located in our big toe, or on the 
moons of Jupiter.

Stathis Papaioannou
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