On Mon, Dec 11, 2006 at 03:26:59PM -0800, William wrote:
> > If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal
> > Turing machine will do for a "higher hand". In which case, the
> > information needed is simply the shortest possible program for
> > simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the
> > information content of the universe.
> What I meant to compare is 2 situations (I've taken an SAS doing the
> simulations for now although i do not think it is required):
> 1) just our universe A consisting of minimal information
> 2) An interested SAS in another universe wants to simulate some
> universes; amongst which is also universe A, ours.
> Now we live in universe A; but the question we can ask ourselves is if
> we live in 1) or 2). (Although one can argue there is no actual
> difference).
> Nevertheless, my proposition is that we live in 1; since 2 does exist
> but is less probable than 1.
> information in 1 = inf(A)
> information in 2 = inf(simulation_A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other
> stuff) = inf(A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) > inf(A)

You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other
computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of
being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A.

This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not!

A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                         [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia                                http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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