Russell Standish wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 11, 2006 at 03:26:59PM -0800, William wrote:
>>> If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal
>>> Turing machine will do for a "higher hand". In which case, the
>>> information needed is simply the shortest possible program for
>>> simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the
>>> information content of the universe.
>> What I meant to compare is 2 situations (I've taken an SAS doing the
>> simulations for now although i do not think it is required):
>> 1) just our universe A consisting of minimal information
>> 2) An interested SAS in another universe wants to simulate some
>> universes; amongst which is also universe A, ours.
>> Now we live in universe A; but the question we can ask ourselves is if
>> we live in 1) or 2). (Although one can argue there is no actual
>> Nevertheless, my proposition is that we live in 1; since 2 does exist
>> but is less probable than 1.
>> information in 1 = inf(A)
>> information in 2 = inf(simulation_A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other
>> stuff) = inf(A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) > inf(A)
> You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other
> computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of
> being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A.
> This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not!
I wasn't aware that there was any accepted way of assigning a probability to
"being in a universe A". Can you point to a source for the proof of this
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