Russell Standish schreef:

> On Mon, Dec 11, 2006 at 03:26:59PM -0800, William wrote: > > > > > If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal > > > Turing machine will do for a "higher hand". In which case, the > > > information needed is simply the shortest possible program for > > > simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the > > > information content of the universe. > > > > What I meant to compare is 2 situations (I've taken an SAS doing the > > simulations for now although i do not think it is required): > > > > 1) just our universe A consisting of minimal information > > 2) An interested SAS in another universe wants to simulate some > > universes; amongst which is also universe A, ours. > > > > Now we live in universe A; but the question we can ask ourselves is if > > we live in 1) or 2). (Although one can argue there is no actual > > difference). > > > > Nevertheless, my proposition is that we live in 1; since 2 does exist > > but is less probable than 1. > > > > information in 1 = inf(A) > > information in 2 = inf(simulation_A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other > > stuff) = inf(A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) > inf(A) > > > > You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other > computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of > being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A. > > This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not! I think I'm following your reasoning here, this theorem could also be used to prove that any probability distribution for universes, which gives a lower or equal probability to a system with fewer information; must be wrong. Right ? But in this case, could one not argue that there is only a small number (out of the total) of "higher" universes containing an SAS, and then rephrase the statement to "we are not being simulated by another SAS" ? --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---